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The release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 marked the beginning ofa transition process during 
which South Africa would finally move from an authoritarian apartheid state to a democratic 
state that respected and upheld the basic principles of human rights. The field of "transition 
politics" is huge. It necessarily encompasses and is a reaction to the years of history prior to 
the period of transition, which may have (and has often) been marked by struggle, whether it 
was violent or passive, against the former regime. It covers areas as broad as the field of 
politics itself from constitution design to public administration reform. Ultimately the raison 
d'etre of a political transition period is encapsulated in the attempt to create a utopian ideal 
state or political entity which corrects the perceived injustices and faults of the system it is 
attempting to replace or redesign. This dissertation focuses on a small but nonetheless 
significant area of that attempt to create the ideal political system. It is an area than has been 
and remains particularly pertinent in South Africa and was particularly important during the 
transition period, namely the intermediation of the demands of interest groups, and in 
particular, the mediation of the demands of key producer interest groups. The following 
quote encapsulates the importance of such relationships in emerging democracies: 
"The tension between demands for consultation and participation versus Governments' 
tendencies towards technocratic decision making has obvious relevance for the political 
sustainability of economic reforms in the short run. Less obvious but equally important are 
the implications for the longer run consolidation of democracy. The ways in which initial 
poliCies are made and early disputes are managed are shaping emerging interest groups' 
ideas of what they can expect of their new Governments and therefore of what strategies and 
tactics they should adopt. The mindsets and organisational arrangements formed in this 
period will influence the characteristics of politics for years to come" (Nelson quoted in 
Raker, 1994: 8). 
Interest group-State relationships 
I define interest groups as "any group of people with shared attitudes and goals who try either 
spontaneously to or consciously to protect or promote their interests by influencing the 
governmental decision making process in order to realise those goals." (Venter, 1998: 280). 
They are distinguishable from political parties by the fact that they do not seek power, they 
have narrower interests or goals, and their membership reflects this. Key producer groups 
represent a distinct group within this description or understanding of interest groups. They 
are distinct in that they are organised, sectional peak association groups whose key function in 
society is production in the economic sense. By organised, it is meant that they are 
constructed to pursue certain objectives. By sectional, it is meant that they advance or protect 
their members' direct interests, as opposed to promotional groups that exist to advance shared 
or common values or ideals. By peak association it is meant that it is a conglomerate interest 
group that organises several sub interest groups into one body. It may be useful to introduce 
Offe's distinction in categorising types of interest groups into "market participants" and 
"policy takers." "Market participants" are described as "all organised collectivities 
representing the supply or demand sides of either labour markets or goods and services 
markets". Key producer groups in South Africa encompass trade union federations such as 
COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) and business groups such as SACOB 
(South African Chamber of Business). Such groups, despite being included in the same 










each other. Business seeks to maximise profit whilst Labour seeks to maximise wages or 
conditions, and frequently one is to the detriment of the other. 
Whilst this dissertation focuses on the market participant variant of interest groups, those 
groups who are "policy takers" or those "whose members are directly affected by state 
polices" (Offe, 1981: l38) are not completely excluded from this study. It is necessary to 
remind ourselves constantly that the activities of both types of groups and the structure of 
their activities within the arena of the state is likely to have an affect on each others roles and 
capacities and on the role and capacity of the state itself. 
Offe places the study of interest groups into three distinct categories or dimensions of 
analysis. Broadly, these can be described as: the perspective from below, or an individual's 
dynamics in the role of interest groups: the organisational perspective, looking at the 
dynamics within an organisation; and finally, the system within which an organisation 
functions and how it is shaped by that system and how it in turn influences that system. It is 
the latter to the dimensions that I wish to examine in the context of South Africa: namely how 
South Africa chose to mediate key interest producer groups in the new democratic state post 
1994. 
But why is such an area important? The thesis presumes that interest groups in some form 
can and do influence public policy, government action and non-actions, decisions and non-
decisions. It presumes that outside influences shape or playa role, whether it is in the form of 
interest groups or another configuration, and policy making or implementation does not occur 
in a vacuum. No groups playa more important role than key producer groups, and this is 
particularly true in South Africa, where such groups played important and unique roles both 
within the apartheid system and in the struggle against it. In addition it is clear that there was 
a need to mediate the influence of key producer interest groups and indeed incorporate them 
into policymaking post 1994. The economic problems that the post apartheid Government 
inherited in 1994 and the need to deliver economic growth and polices which addressed the 
inequitable distribution of wealth within South Africa all contributed towards a massive task 
for a new Government and State that could ill afford to alienate key producer groups in its 
efforts to deliver sustainable policies and ultimately, sustainable results. As Grant points out 
this point is comparable to the problems faced by all Governments. In reference to the British 
Government during the Thatcher years he asserts that "the rejection of consultation and 
negotiation almost inevitably led to implementation problems because those groups/agencies 
affected by the policy failed to co-operate" (Grant, 1985: 85), and the same threat is present in 
South Africa. The need for Government to listen to groups that control capital and labour and 
therefore dominate the economy is clear: The power of key producer groups "rests on the 
ultimate sanctions of economic obstruction or withdrawal" (Offe, 1981, pg. 146). I will 
address these issues in more depth at a later point in this dissertation, but it is clear 
nonetheless that the relationship (whether it be formal or informal) between state and key 
producer interests groups and the form such a relationship takes is a crucial and critical issue. 
Below is a brief description of how that relationship has been set up and formalised in South 
Africa. 
South Africa's Choice - NEDLAC 
Key producer groups in South Africa today currently enjoy a privileged role in terms of their 
ability (even if this remains theoretical) to influence policy in a manner which other interest 











certain groups are afforded privileged access to Government, hitherto common in Western 
European states until the late 1970's. The existence of NED LAC and a Corporatist system of 
interest group mediation again indicates the importance of key producer groups in the modem 
state, in particular in South Africa. 
NEDLAC was formed in February 1995. Its website declares that "at NED LAC, Government 
comes together with organised business, organised labour and organised community 
groupings on a national level to discuss and try to reach consensus on issues of social and 
economic policy. This is called social dialogue. NEDLAC's aim is to make economic 
decision-making more inclusive, to promote the goals of economic growth and social equity". 
It exists to "organise a partnership between government, labour and business in the socio-
economic arena ... it is therefore a negotiating and not an advisory body, whose brief is to 
produce agreements, not recommendations ... agreements negotiated in, and proposals 
recommended by NED LAC are expected to be promulgated by parliament." (See NEDLAC 
Act No. 35, 1994, section 5(1), as quoted in Venter, 283, 1998). 
NEDLAC's structural plan encompasses four chambers, one of which deals with socio-
economic development and includes community based interest organisations. However, 
representation in the remaining three chambers, which deal with monetary, industrial and 
labour policy respectively, is dominated in representational terms by key producer groups and 
the Government. Organised Labour is represented by COSA TU, FEDUSAL (Federation of 
Unions of South Africa) and NACTU (National Council of Trade Unions), representing 
between them over 2 million workers, or approximately 35% of the formal employment 
sector. Business is represented by BSA and NAFCOC (National African Federated Chamber 
of Commerce). Government provides representatives (both in the form of elected politicians 
and officials) from the Departments of Labour, Finance, Trade and Industry, public works and 
other all departments on an ad hoc basis. Representatives from the South African Reserve 
Bank and the Industrial Development Corporation are also participants. 
The South African Labour Bulletin described the work and structure of NED LAC as it was 
intended to function in 1995 thus: 
"Six delegates per constituency sit in each chamber. The chambers meet twice a month to 
draft reports and reach consensus. Experts and advisors are brought in to assist the 
representatives with their work. The Chambers make recommendations to the NEDLAC 
Executive Council. Up to J 8 delegates per constituency sit on this council, which meets 
quarterly. The council receives report-backs from the chambers, reviews progress and 
concludes agreements. Only if there is full consensus in the Executive Council can a 
recommendation from a chamber be changed" About 300 participants attend the annual 
NEDLAC summit, which is chaired by President Mandela or the Deputy President. 
Participants receive feedback and inputs from a broad range of organisations and 
individuals. " (SA Labour Bulletin, 1995: 87). 
The Executive Council has the power to conclude agreements and send them to parliament for 
approval. The issues considered are far reaching. The 1995 Act "requires that all labour 
legislation" and "all changes to socio-economic policy" which "affect the world of work" are 
to be discussed at NEDLAC before parliamentary scrutiny or implementation. According to 











• strive to promote the goals of economic growth, participation in economic decision 
making, and social equity; 
• seek to reach consensus and conclude agreements pertaining to economic and social 
policy 
• consider all proposed labour legislation relating to labour market policy before it is 
introduced in parliament; 
• consider all significant changes to social and economic policy before it is implemented or 
introduced to parliament 
• encourage and promote the formulation of co-ordinated policy on social and economic 
matters" (Clause 5 of NED LAC Act as quoted in Bernstein, 1999: 40-41). 
WhyNEDLAC? 
Why did South Africa choose a corporatist route? Was it the most appropriate choice then? Is 
it the most appropriate choice now? What were and are the alternatives? Has it achieved its 
goals? Is it likely to be able to in the future? It is these questions that I seek to address in my 
examination of the relationship between key producer groups and the state in South Africa. 
Ultimately I argue that the attempt to establish corporatism as a policy-making forum and 
system of key producer group mediation was an appropriate and necessary political choice in 
the light of various trajectories that were occurring in the transition period. The choosing of 
corporatism and the establishment of NED LAC was an instance of transition politics and 
could not be expected to function as more than an instrument of the transition or persist after 
the transition period l . NEDLAC and the attempt to instil a system of corporatism was a 
decision guided by transition politics as opposed to a policy orientated, or policy management 
decision: In addition, it is questionable whether NEDLAC, the outcome, is a genuine form of 
corporatism as theory, past experience or practice would suggest. 
Chapter Outline 
In Chapter One I return to the theory of interest groups and their interaction with the state and 
their role in politics. I examine further the theory of corporatism and draw on the empirical 
example of a previous illustration of corporatism in Western Europe (I review the Austrian 
Case, termed by some as the "model generator" of Corporatism) in order to understand the 
benefits that can be derived from such a system and examine some necessary, sufficient and 
helpful conditions for the successful functioning of Corporatism. I close chapter One by 
examining the criticisms of corporatism to begin our enquiry into whether corporatism was an 
appropriate choice for South Africa regardless of domestic transition related factors that might 
have suggested it was. 
In Chapter Two, I examine the reasons behind South Africa's choice, looking at the apartheid 
precedence and transition impetus towards negotiation. Each of the constituent's views are 
examined and their relative positions both prior to and and at the time of NED LAC's 
formation. Chapter two will attempt ultimately to examine how close or far is NEDLAC from 
the theory of Corporatism and the evidence from examples reviewed in Chapter 1. 
Additionally it seeks to assess what factors were present or absent in South Africa both at the 
time NEDLAC was set up and currently that have an affect on the makeup and functioning of 
NEDLAC. 
1 For the purposes of this study, the transition period is defined as starting with the negotiations that began in 











Chapter Three seeks to assess whether or not NED LAC has or is functioning as intended and I 
review some empirical evidence as to its successes and failures before reviewing the gains 
and losses derived from participation in NED LAC of each of the three main constituencies. 
In Chapter Four, I attempt to establish whether NEDLAC can be considered a corporatist 
institution and if it has impeded or constrained other options that may have led to more 
successful state-key producer group relationships. IfNEDLAC is not functioning as a 
corporatist body, then how are key producer group interests being mediated, and finally, what 













This chapter aims to examine and account for the existence of groups within the state, and 
further the relationship between the state and groups or organised interest representation in 
politics. It aims to provide a solid starting point for the examination of why South Africa 
chose corporatism, and in my conclusion of this chapter I begin that enquiry. In particular the 
chapter focuses on the relationship between the state and key producer groups, and turns to 
examine the existence of formal relationships between such groups and the state in the form 
of corporatism. 
The focus on corporatism begins by tracing its roots and outlining its perceived benefits and 
costs, which contribute to an understanding of why corporatism should be chosen as a method 
of interest intermediation by those groups who are party to it. A review of corporatism in 
Austria is used as an example of how one successful corporatist structure functioned, and the 
benefits that were derived from it. As an example of corporatism, Austria also allows us to 
examine the conditions that might be deemed necessary for a system of corporatism to 
function. Of all conditions, perhaps the most crucial is the need for a balance of power 
between all three parties (state, business, labour). It is the loss of this balance impacted by 
other factors that is blamed for the decline of corporatism in Europe. The balance of power is 
the final focus of the review of corporatism as a theory of and model for state- interest group 
intermediation and recurrent issue throughout this study. 
Groups, the state, and politics 
The binding force for groups is a common interest. At a most basic and implicit level of 
understanding, "groups of individuals with common interests usually attempt to further those 
common interests" (Olson, 1971: 1)2. Individuals are unlikely to belong to a group merely to 
belong; rather they will belong in the hope of attaining something they might otherwise not be 
able to attain if they were acting as an individual. That interest being pursued therefore will be 
in the common interest of all members. 3 
Additionally, humans appear to have a propensity to form groups. "Private organisations and 
groups are ubiquitous ... this ubiquity is due to a fundamental human propensity to form and 
join associations: (Olson, 197]: 17). Gaetano Mosca refers to the herd instinct of humans 
which "underlies the formation of all the divisions and subdivisions that arise within a given 
society and occasion moral conflicts" (Mosca in Olson, ] 971: 17). It is suggested by some 
that the group forming impetus is an aspect of human evolution, with humans moving from 
primitive kinship groups to non-kinship groups reflecting the change from primitive to 
modem society. 
Groups are omnipresent in society and can be found in many forms, functioning in many 
different ways and with many different interests. This study, however, seeks to study the way 
groups function within and with the State. Such groups are separate and distinct from the 
state and will be formed spontaneously, privately and voluntarily by citizens, in contrast to the 
compulsory and coercive character ofthe state. Olson quoted political theorist A. D. Lindsay 
2 In The Logic a/Collective Action Olson infact argued that "rational, self interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or 
group interests" (Olson, 1971: 2) and neither would groups, 
J Of course, as Olson points out, the word group can be used as a label for a number of people with no necessarily unifYing characteristics, 











to elaborate this point: "The common life of society is lived by individuals in all manner of 
social relationships churches, trade unions, institutions of all kinds. The religious, the 
scientific, the economic life of the community develop through these. Each has its own 
development. There is in them a sphere of initiative, spontaneity and liberty. That sphere 
cannot be occupied by the state with its instruments of compulsion" (Lindsay quoted in 
Olson, 1971: 112). 
Group and group formation is therefore a pervasive characteristic of modem society. Indeed, 
the freedom to (or not to, in the case of Switzerland) associate and form groups is in most 
liberal democratic states a formal, if not constitutional, right. But the distinction from the 
state does not preclude groups' involvement with the state in an effort to pursue the common 
interests of their members and it is these groups that are more commonly known as interest 
groups. As such, the inquiry into the role that groups play in the state or the relationship that 
groups have with the state and their involvement with and in politics is both valid and crucial. 
But what is meant by the use ofthe word "state" and "politics"? The state is commonly 
understood to be "the territorial area in which a population is governed by a set of political 
authorities, and which successfully claims the compliance of the citizenry for its laws and is 
able to secure such compliance by its monopolistic control of legitimate force (Roberts, 1971: 
203). South Africa can be described as a liberal democratic state, and as such is characterised 
by popular sovereignty, political equality, popular representation and majority government4 • 
A Liberal Democracy is "a system of representative government by majority rule in which 
some individual rights are nonetheless protected from interference by the state and cannot be 
restricted even by an electoral majority" (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 6). 
Government however, must make decisions as to how to govern, how to allocate resources, 
who to allocate resources to and when, and such a system of decision making is usually 
described as or is commonly known as politics with the decisions being made known 
commonly as public policy. Politics can be described as "the process in a social system by 
which the goals of that system are selected, ordered in terms of priority both temporally and 
concerning resource allocation, and implemented. It thus involves both co-operation and the 
resolution of conflict, by means of the exercise of political authority and, if necessary, 
coercion. Politics usually involves the activities of groups of various kinds, including 
sometimes groups of a specifically political type, such as political parties. It is distinguished 
from other social processes by its concern with the public goals of society." (Roberts, 1971: 
169). 
As political decisions and public policy outcomes effect all areas of life or society, it must be 
expected that those areas affected by certain decisions will want to influence the decisions 
being made, hence the involvement of groups in politics. I return to the definition of interest 
group given in the introduction: "any group of people with shared attitudes and goals who try 
either spontaneously to or consciously to protect or promote their interests by influencing the 
governmental decision making process in order to realise those goals." (Venter, 1998: 280). 
Whether the involvement and activity of groups in politics and policymaking is benign, 
beneficial or negative is a point of contestation. For example, John R. Commons considered 
interest groups and in particular key producer groups to be of such crucial importance that he 
4 Popular Sovereignty means that the state is "recognised by the actors in the international political arena." Political Equality means that 
each citizen has political equality to participate in elections, whilst majority government describes a system of government where conflicts 
are resolved or decisions made by basis of a simple majority. The definitions of majority government differ from state to state. (Van 











advocated the direct election of representatives of an each interest group to the legislature. 
This was, he argued "virtually an indispensable means for the achievement of a just and 
rational economic order" because such pressure groups were more representative of the 
wishes of the people than legislatures based on territorial divisions. He sought "an 
occupational parliament of the American people" sourced from economic interest groups 
which he considered "the most vital institutions in society and the life blood of democracy" 
(Commons, quoted in Olson, 1971: 115-116). Other theorists particularly those ofthe new 
right, argue that groups distort the state's ability to function in a representative and efficient 
manner. Theorists have therefore considered such merits and disadvantages from a 
qualitative viewpoint, but nonetheless, it is unarguable that "groups have long been central to 
the understanding of the policy process" (Smith, 1993: 1) and policy outcomes regardless of 
the form the relationship between the state and groups take. 
At an underlying level, that examination of the relationship between groups and the state is 
also an examination that addresses the nature of power distribution within political systems 
and society. Who has power and who exercises it in what manner in order to influence 
decisions taken and the making of public policy, and conversely who does not have power to 
exert influence, is an important theme. Power is, after all, according to Dahl: "Where A has 
the power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise 
do." Groups, in seeking to pursue the common interests of their members, will attempt to 
exert power in order to ensure that the state meets their demands, and meets those common 
interests. Conversely, the state must also mediate those demands - as resources are always 
finite not all demands can be met. Smith reinterprets Dahls' definition of power thus: "In the 
decision making process, power exists when A gets B to choose policy X when B would have 
chosen policy Y" (Smith, 1993: 18). He also reminds us that group power depends on state 
recognition as much as state power depends on the support of groups. Hence how the state 
and groups structure this relationship and how power is distributed between the group and the 
state, and the relative influence and autonomy that each constituency has is a fundamental 
area of inquiry in politics. Schmitter reminds us that such an inquiry also raises, most 
importantly, the issue of the level of state autonomy that is present, and "whether the state 
has interests of its own and the distinctive resources to make them prevail in the face of 
resistance by those with conflicting interests. This in turn is linked to the question of whether 
the state can design its own policy instruments, i.e. whether it can choose the terrain and 
format for its interaction with social groups and can impose upon these groups the conception 
of interests and mode of collective action that it prefers." (Schmitter, 1984: 35). Corporatism 
as both a theory and a practice suggests one way in which the relationship between the state 
and certain interest groups can be brokered, and it is Corporatism that this chapter seeks to 
examine. 
According to Wyn Grant, Corporatism is best understood as lying "between all inclusive 
general theories of social systems that are too remote from social reality to account for what is 
observed and detailed descriptions of particular phenomena that are not generalised at all." It 
is therefore a "middle range theory" (Grant, 1985: 25). As such, it can be seen as an 
explanatory model at the same time as being an analytical framework. A review of 
corporatism examines those organised groups or interests which are based on the division of 
labour and their relationship with the state, and below I review the historical development of 
corporatism as a theory and as a practical political system of interest mediation in the state. It 
is worth reminding ourselves at this point that "the concrete shape and content of organised 











status ... we can also say that interest representation is determined by ideological, economic 
and political parameters". (Offe, 1981: 124). 
What is Corporatism? 
Schmitter defines corporatism as "A system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-
competitive, hierarchically ordered categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the 
state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports. " 
Schmitter's definition is best understood when compared to his definition of pluralism: "a 
system of interest representation which the constituent units are organised in an unspecified 
number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self determined 
categories which are not specially licensed, recognised, subsidised, created or otherwise 
controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state, and which do not 
exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective activities. )) 
(Schmitter, 1972: 934-6) 
But perhaps Grant offers a clearer definition: fla process of interest intermediation which 
involves the negotiation of policy between state agencies and interest organisations from the 
division of labour in society, where the policy agreements are implemented through the 
collaboration of the interest organisations and their Willingness and ability to secure the 
compliance of their members. The elements ofnegotiation and implementation are both 
essential to my understanding of corporatism. The arbitrary imposition of state polices 
through interest organisations does not constitute liberal corporatism as I understand it; 
equally the negotiation of understandings with no obligation on the part of interest 
organisations to secure the compliance of their members, does not constitute a corporatist 
arrangement as I interpret the term. " (Grant, 1985: 26). 
The roots of corporatism can be traced back to Catholic social thought. In an attempt to react 
to the perceived weakening of the role ofthe church by the growth of trade unionism, 
capitalism and the state, which were continually encroaching into private and social life, the 
Roman Catholic Church encouraged group formation. In addition, the Church bemoaned the 
exposition of workers to the disadvantageous practices of capitalism. The Church sought to 
encourage the role of self-governing groups which would be responsible for the provision of 
welfare and mediate conflict in negotiation with the state: In Rerum Novarum (1891) Pope 
Leo XIII wrote "employers and workmen may of themselves effect much in the matter of 
which we are treating, by means of such associations and organisations ... which draw the 
two classes more closely together" (Quoted in Grant, 1985: 5). 40 years later the existence of 
such groups was viewed by his successor as "if not essential, at least natural to civil society." 
(Pius XI quotewd in Grant, 1985: 5). Of course, the church was not completely selfless in its 
encouragement. As Gallagher points out, " In a predominantly Roman Catholic society, these 
groups would be made up primarily of Roman Catholics, so that public policy would be 
sensitive to the teachings of the church, despite a formal separation of the church and state." 
(Gallagher, 2001: 399). 
Corporatism is commonly associated with fascism. Indeed a variant of corporatism was seen 











Salazar regimes in Spain and Portugal respectively, where the state sought to organise 
politically on a functional or occupation basis as opposed to a representational basis. 
Schmitter usefully distinguishes this type of corporatism as "state corporatism," a distinct and 
separate entity from societal corporatism, the subject of this enquiry. State corporatism 
involves the co-option of key producer groups into the state and "the creation of corporations 
which were created by and kept as an auxiliary and dependent organs of the state" (Schmitter 
quoted in Grant, 1985: 10). Additionally, in state corporatism, "representational monopoly of 
the interest organisation is achieved by state imposed eradication of parallel associations" 
(Maree quoted in Desai and Habib, 1995: 31). It is distinct from societal corporatism, which 
arose as a reaction to pluralism (described briefly above) and involves groups which are 
"autonomous in their origins". (Grant, 1985: 10). Societal corporatism conversely does not 
outlaw other interest groups, although those not granted access through corporatism may have 
a reduced ability to influence the government and pursue their interests. 
Societal corporatism arose, according to Schmitter's hypothesis, following "changes in the 
institutions of capitalism, including the concentration of ownership and competition between 
national economies ... the need to secure the conditions for capital accumulation forced the 
state to intervene more directly and to bargain" (Ham & Hill, 1984: 38). As such societal 
corporatism attempts to deal with the reality of the dominant role that the economy plays in 
the liberal democratic state. The growth of the state and its role, the increased provision of 
public goods and its ability to respond to demands of its citizens makes the state reliant on 
economic development and hence the adoption of corporatism. Middlemas echoes 
Schmitter's work, suggesting that a close relationship between trades unions and employers 
groups and the state gradually develops until such groups become incorporated (note, not 
subordinated) into the governing process in order to maintain stability through the sharing of 
power (Ham & Hill, 1984: 37). A similar viewpoint can be found in the work of Pan itch, who 
views corporatism as a "political structure within advanced capitalism which integrates 
organised socio-economic producer groups through a system of representation and co-
operative mutual interaction at the leadership level and mobilisation and social control at the 
mass level" (Ham & Hill, 1984: 39). As such, the distinguishing character of corporatism is 
the involvement of those groups that can make and deliver effective bargains. This will 
necessarily restrict corporatism to the state and key producer groups, whose power and ability 
to make or deliver effective bargains "rests on the ultimate sanctions of economic obstruction 
or withdrawal" (Offe, 1981, pg. 146). Key producer ?OuPS are in control of key economic 
resources, which are exchangeable with government. 
Who Gains? 
On a practical level, what benefit is derived from or delivered by a system of corporatism? 
What factors make corporatism unique when compared to other forms of interest mediation 
and thus make the benefits of corporatism unique? Corporatism is not, as Grant and 
Schmitter suggest, necessarily State-led, and if this were the case it would suggest that the 
benefits were biased in weighting towards the state. Rather he argues the establishment of 
corporatism is "an osmotic process whereby the modern state and modern interest groups seek 
each other out" (Grant, 1985: 3). There must be benefits for all three actors otherwise the 
rationale for the actors to participate is absent. Grant refers to corporatism as a non-zero sum 
game. All actors gain something, even if it is only marginally more than what would be 
gained from non-participation or is lost by non-participants. Significantly, groups need not be 
equal as such but, as Schmitter points out "must be in a situation of mutual deterrence - each 
5 Much argument revolves around how powerful business is vis-a-vis labour in its control of resources, and this 











sufficiently capable of organised collective action to prevent the other from realising its 
interests directly through social control and/or economic exploitation, and sufficiently 
incapable of unilateral manipulation of public authority to impose its interests directly through 
the state (Schmitter, 1984: 36). Echoing Grant's non-zero sum game description, Schmitter 
further points out that corporatism is the ultimate in compromise: "state actors would usually 
have preferred authoritative regulation; business representatives an allocation through market 
forces; and labour leaders a redistribution of wealth and/or a redefinition of property rights. 
N eo-corporatism satisfies non of these projects, but incorporates elements of all of them" 
(Schmitter, 1984: 37). Corporatism thus indicates a certain balance of power: if any of the 
groups involved were autonomous, they would not rationally need nor participate in a 
corporatist system. 
For the state, the benefits derived from the enhanced ability to implement policy will be the 
most attractive factor. "The incentive for the state to share its authority in this way is that it 
can build support for the enactment and implementation of its polices by granting privileged 
participation to a sectoral interest group sufficiently powerful to deliver support of its 
benefiting constituency" (Grant, 1985: 3). Governments ultimately encourage such a system 
to gain the benefits of co-operation and expertise of the groups and their support in policy 
implementation. For groups, corporatism affords access to Government and the ability to 
influence decision making or policy creation and in doing so, groups will hope to be able to 
further their member's interests. Groups must be regulatory as well as representative, and in 
'being so, they are awarded unrivalled access to policymaking and also may "receive certain 
institutionalised or ad hoc benefits in return for guarantees by the groups' representatives that 
their members will behave in certain ways. Conversely, groups may be also able to extract 
such benefits. In addition, in being awarded representational monopoly, groups may further 
seek to enhance the power and standing of the group vis-avis the state and other groups that 
have been excluded from the corporatism system. 
Although Lehmbruch disagrees with the definition of corporatism thus far, his work suggests 
why corporatism or at the very least the corpo!<ltist method should be so attractive to groups 
and the state. In the opinion ofLehmbruch, the corporatism label is over-simplistic and 
misleading and we should examine and understand corporatism as two subsystems under a 
broader label. Sectoral Corporatism is the representation of a corporate interest limited to a 
specific sector ofthe economy i.e. there is a single organised interested with privileged 
access to a particular policy area. A prime example of this is agriculture or mining. 
Corporate Concertation, on the other hand, is plurality of organisations with antagonistic 
interests who "manage their conflicts and co-ordinate their actions with that of the 
Government expressly in regard to the systemic requirements of the national economy." 
Government and group leaders will veer towards such a system on the basis of an exchange 
calculus or rationality. It is inherently more logical to reach concertation of policy through 
exchange and consensus than it is to engage in adversarial confrontation. Similarly, Cawson 
and Saunders suggest that corporate politics, or relations, tend to characterise the politics of 
production (labour and industrial policy), whilst competitive politics will be dominated by the 
politics of consumption (i.e. welfare or education policy). (Ham & Hill, 1984: 39). 
011;on sums up the costs and benefits of formal group participation with the State into eight 
points. Benefits gained stem from the ability to influence policy, the benefits of cartelisation 
(through exchange of information and co-ordination with other groups), the benefits derived 
) -
from efficiency and the division of labour, and finally, the benefit derived from the . 











Costs stem from the loss of freedom, or the implicit need to recognise and implement 
agreements, the loss of purity, from the possibility of having to compromise a groups' 
position, the cost of responsibility and finally, the costs which stem from the loss of control 
which might arise from involvement with the state. (Richardson & Jordan, 1979: 177-178). 
For business, which inherently believes in the ideology of the minimalist state, individualism, 
free markets and the pursuit of profit, the reasons for co-operation through corporatism must 
be particularly compelling. "The main concern of chief executives is to make a profit. The 
costs of participating in politics in terms oftime, money and risk are high and therefore 
business will only participate if its interests are directly affected. Business distrust of the state 
means that it does not want to participate in activity which might encourage intervention in its 
industry". (Smith, 1993: 23). Indeed, Vogel suggests that business only organised politically 
or sought to involve itself in politics or influence politics because of issues that were placed 
on the political agenda by other groups (such as the environment) which thfeatened their 
interests and the environment within which they existed. Nonetheles£, corporatism allows 
business and other producer groups "to make reciprocal agreements with each other and with 
government while avoiding overt conflict" (Smith, 1993: 33) hence ensuring stability. 
Similarly, trade unions and groups representing labour may also support corporatism to 
ensure the stability of the environment that such group's function in. For labour, the benefits 
must be equally compelling. The benefits of stability must outweigh the benefits that could 
be gained through action taken of a more confrontational or militant nature, such as through 
striking, and those benefits have to be visible and communicable to the members of the 
workforce who are represented by trade unions. Truman, for example, hypothesises that 
"there has been a series of disturbances and dislocations consequent upon the utopian attempt, 
as Polanyi calls it, to set up a completely self regulating market system. This attempt 
involved a policy of treating the fictitious factors ofland, labour and capital as if they were 
real, ignoring the fact that they stood for human beings or influences closely affecting the 
welfare of humans. Application of this policy inevitably meant suffering and dislocation-
unemployment, wide fluctuations in prices, waste and so forth. These disturbances inevitably 
produced associations of owners, or workers, or farmers operating upon government to 
mitigate and control the ravages of the system through tariffs, subsidies, wage guarantees, 
social insurance and the like. (Truman quoted in Olson: 1971: 123). 
Hence, according to Schmitter, the emergence of corporatism as commonly seen in post 
World War 2 Europe can be seen as a result of "largely the unintended outcome of a series of 
disparate interest conflicts and policy crises in which none of the class or state actors involved 
was capable of imposing its preferred solution upon others. (Schmitter, 1984: 37). In other 
words, corporatism is the "best worst option" for all groups. 
Who Loses? 
The main losers in corporatism will be those groups who are not awarded representational 
status by the state - all groups who are not considered key producer groups are effectively 
excluded from policy making even though the policies considered, or the agreements made 
may affect them directly, for example, groups representing the unemployed. Corporatism 
also has a questionable role or status vis-a-vis democracy, parliament or the legislature and 
citizen participation. Ultimately corporatism overrides the core principles of democracy and 
democratic functioning within the state. Schmitter points out that "corporatism's very success 
at keeping political life ruly and effective has been purchased at the price of organisational 











for the individualistic norms of citizen participation and accountability characteristic of a 
liberal democratic order" (Schmitter, 1981: 313). 
Austria: the Model Generator 
The theoretical review of corporatism above provides an understanding of the perceived 
benefits and drawbacks of a corporatist system, however to discover how corporatism 
functions and what conditions it may need to function (and function as it is intended to) it is 
appropriate to look at a working example of corporatism. Corporatism as a practical political 
arrangement became a prominent feature in many European states in the three decades 
following the Second World War, and was largely deemed successful due to the economic 
expansion that was taking place at the same time. This was explained by the "positive 
relationship between economic performance and the degree of corporatism in the industrial 
relations system that passes through a political exchange mechanism between a labour union 
ready to slow wage demands and employers and government willing to keep employment 
levels high and to maintain fiscal equity" (Treu, 1992: 28). No case is more infamous than the 
case of Austria, which I focus on below 
Much of this case study is taken from the work of Bernd Marin, who reviews corporatism in a 
succinct manner in Austria - The Paradigm Case of Liberal Corporatism (Marin, 1985). As 
one example of corporatism, Austria, is often referred to as the "model generating" or 
prototype example of corporatism. Post Second World War corporatism took shape in the 
"Wirtschafts und Sozialpartnerschaft (WSP) which enjoyed success and support well into 
the 1990's. 
Marin argues that corporatism itself is "based on a latent guideline which is that of organising 
the (capitalist) economic system's rationality into politics ... this primacy of economic 
development not only makes economism/productivism a dominant integrating and latent 
ideological force of politics, but it also fundamentally changes the basic rules of the political 
game" (Marin, 1985: 116). However, he reminds us that corporatism does not aim to effect 
de-ideologisation or the end of ideology within the modern state, rather that corporatism 
presupposes opposition but also can only take place if there is an ideological undetermination 
in order to produce a basic consensus. 
Austrian corporatism cannot be interpreted as a new socio-economic order as some critics, 
such as Winckler, would suggest. Neither is it a modern version of state corporatism. It does 
not imply that there is class or producer group harmony, nor has it instituted the class struggle 
by subordinating labour organisations, consequently it also not an arena for privileged or elite 
interests. Rather it is a "system of well organised, mixed capitalism and is fundamentally 
non-etatist. .. (where) antagonistic co-operation between functional interests is free of state 
regulation ... it does not challenge a reformist bourgeois hegemony, it is politically 
undetermined and may benefit labour or capital (or both alternately or differentially in 
different aspects .. .is the opposite to reactionary, particularistic, sectional or selective 
corporatism or clientelistic protectionism" (Marin, 1985,92-93). Below I briefly describe the 
Austrian system. 
The Chamber system: Austrian Chambers are "statutory, nationwide, universal" and every 
working citizen is required by law to be a member of at least one Chamber. A large number 











they are obliged to represent non-particularistic common interests, and negotiate fully 
internally before external ising demands and must function in a democratic manner. Such 
behaviour affords each of the chambers' consultation and advisory rights. 
Parallel free associability: Like most liberal democracies, free associability is a right and is 
encouraged, and according to Marin, "flourishes." Whilst the voluntary groups' areas of 
interests overlap with the statutory Chambers, they exist to compensate for weaknesses, 
underrepresentation or the lack of representation of sectors with traditional or historical 
importance in the chamber system. 
Monopoly business representation: the chamber of commerce is the only business 
representative. The Austrian state recognises implicitly that the power of business or capital 
is greater than that of Labour and therefore potentially more disruptive. The statutory 
existence of one business representative allows for a "measure of indirect political control of 
the business class ... whereas labour must organise freely to act as a responsible interlocutor, 
free business associability must be regulated in order to reach an equivalent political capacity" 
(Marin, 1983: 1987). 
Industrial and Unitary Unionism. Austrian unionism is additionally characterised by 
centralisation and concentration - Marin terms these characteristics as "structural conditions 
of corporatist co-operation" (Marin, 1985: 97) 
Concentration, centralisation and modernisation: Concentrated labour relations are a key 
feature with four organisations representing the vast majority of labour interests. 
Negotiations between small number of groups will proceed with more ease than if a 
multiplicity of groups is involved. Additionally, all actors in the corporatist system are 
internally highly centralised. "Whereas there is centralisation without co-operation, there is no 
co-operation without centralisation - a kind of iron law of intermediary interest 
intermediation" (Marin, 1985: 99). The organisational modernisation of groups has allowed 
them to handle "internal variety and a multitude of turbulent environments" and the "complex 
and specialised bureaucracies" (Marin, 1985, 1 00) have developed through and are 
characterised by the rationalisation of administration, and the professionalisation of such 
associati ons. 
Political Linkages: "In Austria, the links between the subsystems of interest intermediation 
and that of government/party politics take the form of intensive mutual interpenetration. " 
(Marin, 1985: 101) 
Historical impetus: Attempts to institutionalise corporatistic procedures were attempted prior 
to the fascist authoritarian state of 1933-1945, and its roots (although ultimately a failed 
endeavour) can be traced back to the tum of the century. Repeated attempts were not 
successful until post 1945, when the balance offorces between labour and business made 
corporatism an unavoidable option. 
The Rnles: In Austria - the "unwritten rule of not writing down the rules" allowed for 
indeterminacy which ultimately helps explain how corporatism works or is adhered to by all 
parties. Indeterminacy has four primary dimensions, including voluntariness, informality, 
institutional ambiguity and a pyramid of institutionalisation. According to Marin, "conflict 
regulation between adversary interest associations will be more stable the more it is 











able to create more mutual trust and binding obligations than formal coercive norms or 
written contracts, pacts or treaties would ever be able to generate between collective political 
actors" (Marin, 1985, 111). 
Popular support: Polls have consistently shown overwhelming popular support for Austrian 
corporatism. It is contended that this is not only a result of economic growth, but also 
because of the " extensive political credits of generalised trust, loyalty and legitimacy" that is 
the outcome of corporatism. 
Economic and social structures and policies: The Austrian economy is characterised by 
mixed capitalism, where the balance is between family, trans or multinational and state-led 
capitalism. Socially, class forces are also balanced, with an absence of a strong financial or 
industrial bourgeoisie and differentiation between the upper classes and political and 
economic ruling class. Economic policies are characterised by the label "Austro-
Keynesianism" which seeks to make the attainment of economic goals "structurally 
dependent on associational participation as well as on co-operation and co-ordination between 
all economic policy makers" (Marin,1985: 123). 
Gallagher et al remind us however, that the success of Corporatism in Austria rests on the 
cultural values placed on collective accommodation. "Fully fledged corporatism is a 
comprehensive and deep rooted decision making culture rather than just a collection of 
superficial institutions." (Gallagher et aI, 2001: 218). 
Conditions for Corporatism 
What can the example of Austria and other empirical evidence and examples of corporatism 
in Western Europe show us? The existence of such evidence has given rise to the 
examination of the preconditions, conditions and factors necessary for the existence of 
corporatism. Gallagher et al argue that structural preconditions must include the following: 
• A workforce organised into a small number of powerful unions 
• A business community dominated by a small number of powerful firms and organised into 
a powerful employers federation 
• Centralised wage bargaining 
• A powerful state, actively involved in the economy 
• Employers and Unions should have a fully institutionalised role in policy making and 
implementation 
• Consensus should exist between all actors on broad social values 
• All actors should display a preference for bargained outcomes, rather than outcomes 
imposed or won through conflict 
• The state should have a long tradition of social democratic rule 
• The economy should be small and open, with high expenditure on social programmes 
Economic conditions appear to be a critical factor. It is argued that corporatism can only 
work under economic conditions that are favourable to all groups in order for all groups to be 
able to deliver the necessary goods that will cement bargains or agreements. Corporatism, it 
is argued, tends to fall apart when resources become scarcer and interest groups must bargain 
more competitively to divide up a pie that is fixed rather than one that is continually 
expanding" (Gallagher et aI, 2001: 406). Whilst policies being discussed may tend to be 











of bargaining and the groups (particularly labour representing groups) means that the policy 
discussions may widen to encompass social policy demands, for example, education. If the 
state cannot deliver or offer compromises based on social policies as an additional bargaining 
tool, the ability to reach compromise may be hampered. 
The size and structure of interests groups within a state is certainly influential. As discussed 
previously, strong interest groups make agreements easier to facilitate and implement. The 
existence of a multiplicity of groups will hamper decision-making and implementation as 
certain groups may seek to "free ride" on the backs of other groups, benefiting from 
implementation but avoiding the costs (if they exist) of influence. However, whether the 
existence of strong interest groups is a cause of corporatism or an effect of it is a contested 
point. Similarly, state characteristics are an important factor. A fragmented, decentralised 
state is not likely to lend itself to corporatist arrangements. Centralised government will tend 
to lend itself to centralised interest group mediation styles. Political culture is an additional 
important factor. As seen in the case of Austria, the willingness to compromise is crucial. 
The emergence of corporatism and social partnerships post World War 2 in Europe was based 
on the need to establish an economic policy geared towards restructuring the state, industry 
and business. Such an impetus enabled the emphasis on and the popular acceptance of the 
legitimacy of functional representation in policy making. Corporatism works, it is suggested 
"if government, employers and unions recognise their necessity and work to reduce the 
hardship (adjustment) they cause" (Gallager et aI, 2001: 409). Grant argues that corporatism 
was characteristic ofa type of European structural adjustment, which was facilitated through 
intervention. Such intervention needed expertise, which was not available within the state, 
hence, the establishment of corporatism. 
In sum, Lehmbruch points out that corporatism "was produced by long term influences that 
could not be short circuited" (Lehmbruch & Schmitter, 1982: 125). In reviewing these 
conditions, we can conclude that "it is conceivable that there are societies that, for whatever 
reasons, have not and cannot acquire the capacity to develop corporatist structures" (Streeck 
quoted in Grant, 1985: 11). 
Balance of Power 
Perhaps the most critical element in both the theory and the practice of corporatism is the 
issue of the balance of power between the three actors. The ideal model of corporatism 
assumes a triangular state-social structure, where all three partners are roughly equal or at 
least hold a mutual deterrent against each other. Much criticism of corporatism stems from 
the likelihood or reality of that assumption, and it is argued that in fact the balance of power is 
likely to be uneven resting either with the state or the interest groups co-opted into 
corporatism. For example, the state may be beholden to those interest groups it has chosen to 
co-opt into corporatism. As Dunleavy and O'Leary suggest, the state may become "a 
machine which implements bargains struck by the peak associations negotiating inside state 
forums and delivering their members compliance with eventual decisions ... elected 
governmental and administrative elite's are passive functionaries who simply facilitate the 
bargains." (Dunleavy & O'Leary 195, 1987). 
Conversely, for governments, if the balance of power is in their favour, corporatism allows it 
to pick and choose whom to negotiate with - it creates its own insider groups, often at the 
expense of all those left outside. "Sham" corporatism can be used by the state to great 











to propose it is fully committed to the ideology of consultation and co-operation. Ultimately, 
however, it is quicker, more convenient and produces social control more economically when 
dealing with a small number of organisation leaders than"to seek to achieve a dialogue 
directly with citizens. Group leaders can easily be bought of in some way, and once co-opted 
can usually deliver a quiescent membership in support of the status quo" (Dunleavy and 
O'Leary, 1997, 164). Offe also argues that corporatism, in terms of bureaucratic policy 
making and implementation, gives the state an additional element of control. By admitting 
corporate groups into the public policy process, decisions that are made by consensus are less 
likely to be resisted or obstructed. Interest group organisational discipline can be used to 
prevent opposition from within the groups, further extending Government control and 
enhancing implementability. Opposition from within interest groups in any case will be less 
likely as the opposition will have to attack both Government and the leadership of its own 
group. 
Finally, Trade Unions are commonly perceived as the weakest group in corporatism. Panitich 
and other critics go as far as suggesting that corporatism is little more than a "political 
structure designed to integrate the organised working class in the capitalist state" (Quoted in 
Grant, 1985: 24). Winckler further suggests that corporatism only exists to the extent that it is 
functional for the state and business. The gains supposedly derived by labour groups are 
illUSOry. 
This examination only touches on these issues, and I further examine the issue of the balance 
of power within corporatism in Chapter Four. Despite the perceived benefits and the 
theoretical arguments behind corporatism that to many are compelling, Corporatism was 
subject to decay throughout Europe in the latter part of the 20th century. Several reasons are 
suggested for this decline. Firstly, corporatism had become fiscally unviable in changed 
economic circumstances. "Citizens seemed unwilling to pay the taxes that would finance the 
increases in social expenditure that would grease the wheel ... Governments were constrained 
by the threat or reality of deficits" (Gallager, 2001: 122). The presumption of a division 
between employers and employees began to fragment as industrial restructuring occurred. 
"The very success of neocorporatism systems had produce standards of living that were so 
high that they encouraged class decomposition." (Gallager, 2001: 123). The ideological 
arguments favouring free markets and the minimal state began gaining ground, whilst new 
issues, such as the environment, the crisis in the welfare state, and international development 
arose which could not be dealt with within a neocorporate framework but were nonetheless 
economically important issues. Finally, the economies that corporatism resided in stopped 
performing at levels over and above non-corporatist states. 
Other commentators such as Bell and Bonefeld link the decline of corporatism to the 
ascendancy of post industrialism and post-Fordism. Whilst post industrialism refers to the 
breakdown of heavy industry and the shift towards service oriented economies, post-Fordism 
refers to the "diversity, differentiation and fragmentation" of production and consumption 
versus the Fordist "homogeneity and standardisation of the economy and the organs ofthe 
state" (Bell in Smith, 1993: 78). The result has been a change in the status and power of 
certain groups and hence the change in relationship between the state and such groups. 
Bonefeld predicted that "people's prime economic category will change from producer to 
consumer and so their main political interests will be as consumers rather than producers. 
This greater complexity and diversity of interests should also weaken the power of the state. 











the types of corporatist arrangements indicative of the past." (Bonefeld quoted in Smith, 1993, 
79) 
The obvious choice for South Africa? 
South Africa did not choose an innovative system for key producer group - state relations -
rather the choice it made in choosing corporatism could be said to be innovative. The choice 
of corporatism appears contradictory to many aspects reviewed in this chapter: many of the 
factors purported as necessary for its successful functioning are not present, and South Africa 
displays relatively few of the characteristics present in previous examples of corporatism. 
Little comparison, if any, can be drawn between Austria and South Africa. It is questionable 
whether a model based on social and economic partnership in Western Europe is applicable to 
South Africa. After all, such economies were characterised by "near full employment, a 
phenomenal work ethic and mass literacy. South Africa, conversely, is a "labour surplus 
economy in a labour surplus region: its work ethic resembles that of Latin America far more 
than Europe, and its population suffers from a 30-40 illiteracy rate and an even greater lack of 
numeracy" (Bernstein, 1999: 53). If corporatism is characterised, and is reliant on the 
monopoly representation of each particular interests, then it is striking that each South 
Africa's key producer groups feature disunity and a lack of monopoly interest representation. 
Friedman argued in 1991 that "there are not interest groups anywhere near that status" in 
South Africa and that any attempt to institute corporatism would have been a mistake and 
likely to be a system which "entrenches unrepresentative elites." These issues are examined in 
further detail in chapters three and four. Especially important is the issue of the balance of 
power between the three groups, which whilst only touched upon in this chapter will be 
further examined in the South African context at several points throughout this dissertation. 
Perhaps, however, we need to look past the previous examples and understandings or theories 
of corporatism that have been examined in this chapter to understand why South Africa chose 
the path of corporatism and what it is attempting to achieve through such a choice. It must 
not be forgotten the uniqueness of the position that South Africa was and remains in, and as 













Throughout the 1980 's, corporatism was in retreat. The trend was the same in one country 
after another. In Britain, a weak legacy of corporatism was defeated by Thatcherism; in 
Sweden a strong legacy was weakened by "globalisation." Among advanced industrialised 
countries the trend was almost universal ... South Africa appears to be trying to defy the 
global trend." (Webster, 1995: 25). 
Why then, if corporatism was in its decline throughout the rest ofthe world, did South Africa 
choose such a path in defiance of global trends and the existence of several factors and 
evidence militating against its success? Chapter Two seeks to answer this question. Anne 
Bernstein asserts that NEDLAC's origins lie in the special circumstances that characterised 
South African labour relations in the 1980's and 1990's whilst the establishment of NED LAC 
itself should be seen as a necessary public partnership at an important stage of South Africa's 
development. (Bernstein, 1999: 40-41). Certainly South Africa presents some unique factors 
which must be taken into account, and it is those origins and special factors that the chapter 
seeks to examine. Through an examination of all constituencies' positions, 1 examine why 
corporatism was either deemed necessary or at the very least supported or engaged in, and 
what the impetus behind such support was. 
Perhaps one of the most important and unique factors to incorporate into any evaluation of 
corporatism in South Africa is the unique relationship that exists between the dominant and 
ruling political party (the ANC) and one ofthe trade union federations, COSATU. COSATU 
is also dominant in its representation of employees in the formal employment sector within 
the trade union movement. It is this relationship which I examine first. 
The ANC- Trade Union Relationship 
COSATU's predecessor, FOSATU (Federation of South African Trade Unions) was not 
politically active. Most commentators argue that FOSATU's support of the mass stay-away 
staged in November 1984 that involved approximately 800,000 people should be seen as the 
beginning of formal political involvement. The formation of COSATU followed and 
following the formation of COSA TU in December 1985 talks were held with the ANC, at the 
time in exile in Lusaka. The excerpt below is from the joint statement that was issued at the 
culmination of the meeting. 
As a representative of our working class, COSATU is seized with the task of engaging the 
workers in the general democratic struggle, both as an independent organisation and as an 
essential component of the democratic forces in our country (Quoted in Desai & Habib, 
1995: 30). 
Desai and Habib observe that "this meeting signalled the beginning ofCOSATU's shift into a 
broad based Congress Alliance. Despite vigorous contestation of this strategic shift, by its 
1989 Congress, COSA TU had accepted "the ANC as the leading organisation in the fight for 
National liberation" (Desai & Habib, 1995: 30). The late 1980's also saw COSATU affiliate 
itself with the United Democratic Front, which grew to become the largest, unbanned anti 
apartheid federation. The UDF was allied to the goals of the ANC in exile, and was replaced 











Party (both having been recently unbanned) and COSATU. The alliance was further 
formalised by the agreement that 20 COSA TV representatives would be elected onto the 
ANC National Parliamentary Electoral slate, a practice that was carried forward from the 
1994 elections to the 1999 elections. 
Roger Southall, in evaluating the relationship between the three partners, cited the view of 
some commentators: "the relationship between the ANC, SACP, and COSATU represents a 
strategic compromise between competing tendencies within the liberation camp ... the first is 
the national democratic tradition of the ANC and SACP, which sees the liberation as a two 
stage process, with political democracy, involving a multi-class alliance of the oppressed, 
preceding a transition to socialism. The second is the community based trade union tradition, 
which view struggles in the factories as ultimately subordinate to political struggle. The third 
is the "workerist" union tradition, which emphasises participatory democracy in the shopfloor 
and in politics" (Southall, 2001: 35). Nevertheless, writing on the alliance, Sam Shilowa, 
former General Secretary of COSA TV wrote: "the fact that we are in alliance with the ANC 
and SACP does not make us one organisation. It does not mean that there will be no 
differences on major polices, strategies and tactics ... the alliance consists of independent 
organisations ... there is nonetheless agreement to co-operate, consult and take joint decisions 
on collective action in pursuit of social and economic emancipation" (Shilowa, 1997: 68-69). 
This description is at best brief and simplistic, but nonetheless a basic understanding of the 
relationship and its origins is necessary when examining the dynamics behind the 
establishment of NED LAC , both immediately prior to and during the transition period as the 
review below attempts to assess. This theme will be re-examined in Chapter Three when I 
evaluate the success of NED LAC. 
Transition politics - the consensus on consensus politics 
In 1991 Steven Friedman wrote that "a post apartheid democracy can be created only by a 
compromise between the major political forces ... compromises will be essential, but none 
may be more vital, or more difficult, than that over the economy" (Friedman, 1991,2). This 
compromise was all the more urgent when one considers the minority ownership of resources 
that characterised the South African economy that was reflected in the political system. For 
many black South Africans, therefore, the end of white rule meant not only political freedom 
but also economic betterment, and this was frequently a focus of the anti-apartheid struggle. 
However, the symbolism of the anti-apartheid resistance movement which had served to unite 
disparate groups into one force had provided unity, goals and aspirations, and eventually 
succeeded in conquering the apartheid regime, failed to offer tangible polices for economic 
restructuring and change6• Not only were economic issues enormously important in 
themselves in the South African context, but as Habib and Padayachee note "political 
transitions enable new social groups to enter the political arena; in so doing they create the 
possibility for significant changes in the economic policies. The debate around future 
economic polices has in some instances become on of the central contests among contending 
social groups and organisations" (Habib & Padayachee, 2000, 245). 
6 "Resistance movements cannot seek the consent of all in their own camp to specific compromises unless they 
acknowledge that the camp is made up of particular interests, not all of whom will benefit to the same degree 
from a given policy. But this would risk dissolving the cement which binds the movement; particular interests 
would be encouraged to organise around their differences because not everything they want can be achieved 
through the movement alone. To maintain symbolic unity, they therefore avoid specifYing the compromises 











Thus the ANC faced a double edged dilemma when it considered the economy. Firstly it had 
to decide what policies to adopt and secondly it had to consider how it would mediate 
between groups with different interests which had previously been united under one banner, 
fighting a common cause, but under democratic conditions would be allowed and encouraged 
to pursue interests independently. The ANC was forced, as a matter or urgency, to recognise 
the existence of special and diverse interests and mediate them. The ANC's solution to this 
problem was corporatism. In choosing to mediate through a corporatist institution it sought to 
"reduce pressure on the state by recognising the demands of organised interests ... forcing 
them to bargain with other contenders." 
The priority for economic policy was, in its most simple terms, that it had to be seen to be 
capable of delivering change. As mentioned above, the nature of the resistance movement 
denied the ANC the opportunity in exile to formulate coherent policies and it is arguable that 
it was perhaps neither a priority nor feasible in terms of its actual ability to do so. It was 
COSA TU'S advanced familiarity with policy (as compared to the ANC), due to its 
involvement with and as a major player in the economy whilst the ANC was in exile, that 
became the main influence and impetus behind the economic policy workshop decisions taken 
in Harare in 1990 which broadly favoured a "growth through redistribution" orientation. 
However post 1990 the ANC was seen to be moving toward a more independent position, 
dealigning itself from the views of COSA TU and the trade union movement in general. What 
emerged was a distinctly more "neo-liberal" economic agenda which Habib and Padaychee 
argue was a result of "the ANC's perception of the balance of economic and political power at 
both the global and local level" (Habib & Padaychee, 2000: 245). From 1991 onwards the 
ANC began mooting a move towards neo-liberal polices and "began projecting more 
conciliatory sentiments to business people". A particularly significant turning point, 
according to Tom Lodge, was the ANC National Conference in 1991. At the conference the 
"growth through redistribution" phrase was conspicuous in its absence and appeared to have 
been dropped from ANC rhetoric and policy altogether. Its absence was in explained by the 
explicit suggestions and propositions within the Draft Policy Guidelines of certain neo liberal 
policies, such as the introduction of privatisation in order to achieve a reduction in the size of 
the public sector. Habib and Padaychee sum up the shift thus: "interviews, statements by 
ANC leaders, and party documents, then, show that structural factors constrained the 
behaviour and choices of key actors. Political elites perceived an unfavourable distribution of 
power in the economic arena (defined by) the ideological hegemony of market discourse, and 
the state's dependence on the financial resources ofinternational financial agencies, foreign 
investors, and the domestic business community. This structural distribution of power 
conditioned the behaviour and decisions of political elites in the ANC and the state, and led 
them to rethink their earlier economic proposals" (Habib & Padaychee, 2000: 255). 
Such moves influenced the content of Reconstruction and Development Programme, 
published in 1994, which outlined the ANC's economic policy and served as the ANC's 1994 
election manifesto. As Lodge points out, although its origins can be found "within 
COSATU's policy establishment ... its intellectual evolution became increasingly 
complicated and drew upon a progressively broader range of tributaries" (Lodge, 1999: 10). 
The RDP aimed to alleviate poverty and reconstruct the economy, but aimed to do so through 
"neither commandist central planning nor unfettered free markets." It sought, for example, to 
establish development forums which would "bring together all major stakeholders" (Bond 











However, the decision to follow a neo-liberal path provided little guidance as to how the ANC 
would implement such policies. Habib suggests that the problems of implementation, and the 
possibility of these problems being exacerbated due to a lack of support, were the key factors 
in the South African ANC Government to institute corporatism. Habib supports his argument 
with theoretical explanations of the emergence from three schools of international literature, 
as reviewed by Habib (Habib, 1997). It is the latter of the schools of thought reviewed that 
Habib favours,7 which suggests that corporatism is little more than "state creations in time of 
crisis" (Habib, 1997: 69). Stepan's review focussed on the institutions of state corporatism 
implemented by Latin American states. "State economic elites entered into an alliance with 
the military and multinational corporations in order to achieve the social peace that was 
required for the realisation of their national development plans" Corporatism therefore was a 
natural political response of elites in the developing world (Habib, 1997: 70). In recognising 
that this theory is only applicable to those countries who have a form of state corporatism, 
Habib furthers his argument by reviewing the work of Charles Maier. Maiers' work seeks to 
apply the crisis response to Western European societal corporatism and echoes the study of 
corporatism theory in Chapter one. Maier argued that Western European corporatism "was 
motivated by state elite's sense of political and economic vulnerability." Sustaining these 
corporatist features in subsequent decades was facilitated by the rise of social-democratic 
parties and the legitmation of social democratic ideology which "was built upon the premise 
of continued bargaining between class actors for political and social gains" (Quoted in Habib, 
1997: 70). 
Thus, in a similar vein, the ANC realised that the adoption of a neo-liberal economic policy 
was bound to be the cause of contention within the alliance and quite possibly amongst the 
population as a whole possibly resulting in mass discontent and unrest. It therefore sought, 
through corporatism, to co-opt the labour movement as the vanguard of popular support thus 
neutraIising potential opposition having given the labour movement a "privileged" position in 
the area of economic policy making. In addition the ANC recognised that immediately pre 
and post 1994 the party was still politically and economically vulnerable, and therefore sought 
to consolidate support and alienate those who chose not to support it. NEDLAC arose, in sum 
in attempt to "neutralise opposition to this new political and economic order. This became an 
urgent priority particularly because of the fragility of the transition, and the fact that the 
political and economic settlement represented a significant compromise8 that did not permit 
the ANC to address the material grievances of and deliver on the electoral promises it made to 
its constituency" (Habib, 1997: 71). 
Further conditions at the time also contributed toward the establishment of corporatism. The 
"ideological rubric of national unity" (Habib, 1997: 61) was dominant throughout the 
transition period - and as such, corporatism was seen as the natural extension of the 
normative impetus. Alec Erwin wrote, in reference to the proposed RDP: 
"In unions, civics, peace structures and forums, all manner of organisations and people are 
grappling with very serious problems communists, racists, nationalists, workers, capitalists, 
7 The former two schools of though reviewed by Habib are the "historical continuity" and "societal reflection 
schools. The "historical continuity" school "focussed primarily on Latin America and argued that corporatist 
political features on the continent have their roots in a political culture grounded in hierarchy, status and 
patronage". The "societal reflection" school "suggested that corporatist political arrangements were merely a 
reflection of the natural organisation of particular societies." (Habib, 1997: 68-69). 












humanitarians, - and just ordinary people. We must rank as negotiating capital of the world. 
Organisations and people are dealing with the very same problems that will and are being 
posed by reconstruction and development conflicting interests, tension, corruption and hard 
choices (Erwin, 1994: 40). 
The unity impetus was clearly present within the tripartite alliance, enforced by the overlap of 
membership between the three organisations which meant that the ANC had little option but 
to introduce some form of formal co-operation with the labour movement which also at the 
time was in support of corporatism (as discussed below). To not do so may have caused 
"debilitating divisions and tensions within the ruling party itself' (Habib, 1997: 71). The 
strength of COSA TU itself, as an independent body outside the alliance was also a significant 
factor. Its ability to mobilise mass reaction was again a factor that could easily be used to 
disturb or threaten the fragile transition. A mass reaction against the ANC may have also 
threatened economic stability and discouraged investment, further alienating business and 
hampering economic reconstruction attempts. 
Jeremy Cronin suggests an altogether different interpretation of the initial move towards 
bargaining and consensus broking and later to formal corporatism. The ANC, as he saw it, 
recognised that "negotiated transition has to be managed as a process of elite pacting. Elites9, 
capable of delivering major constituencies, jointly manage the transition towards a new 
institutional dispensation. In the process a new centrist bloc is consolidated and right and left 
forces are marginalised" (Cronin, 1994: 7). Such an argument is backed up the 
marginalisation of the Pan Africanist Congress and the Freedom Front. He further argues that 
"popular aspirations are a threat to elite pacting on the democratic rules of the game" 
(Cronin, 1994: 8) hence the need for elite bargaining over mass action. 
Trade unions - apartheid, transition and beyond 
That the South African Trade Union movement played an integral role in the anti apartheid 
struggle is unquestionable. The trade union movement is viewed by many as the vanguard of 
the liberation struggle whilst its political counterparts (the ANC and SACP) were 
underground, formally banned by the state. Indeed the Apartheid State recognised the power 
trade unions had to tum the tide of apartheid and until 1978, the state sought to deny 
recognition of any black labour organisation. However, in 1978 "confronted with a growing 
militant, unregulated African trade union movement the state scrambled to fashion an 
alternative strategy to neutralise the emerging threat" (Habib, 1997: 58) and legalised African 
(Black) trade unions, seeking to co-opt them into the National Manpower Commission. With 
registration brought legalisation and most trade unions used this position as a tool for 
increasing membership, enhancing their organisations and pushing forward labour demands. 
These "embryonic" years saw membership grow from 700,000 in 1979 to 3 million in 1993, 
and the development of the trade union as an independent movement from both the ANC and 
SACP. The fear that political agitation may have "led to a neglect of workplace organisation 
whilst inviting repression" (Adler & Webster, 17) meant that the union movement in the early 
1980's was not overtly politically engaged. The emphasis was on "building industrially based 
structures, concentrating on shopfloor issues while remaining - for reasons of survival -
unaffiliated to the exiled liberation movements" (Adler & Webster, 18). According to Adler 
et aI, the movement towards political alignment arose from the threat of marginalisation, 
where a growth in social movements threatened the separation of the trade union worker/class 
struggle from the national democracy struggle. Baskin notes that "industrial citizenship 











without political citizenship was a fundamentally unstable arrangement. The result was a 
politically engaged union movement combining socio-political and bread and butter 
demands" (Baskin, 1996: 8). Hence, as examined above, the allegiance with the ANC was 
constructed in 1985. The allegiance also marked a shift in the unionist tradition in South 
Africa, as Desai and Habib note, to political unionism, which can be described as "a form of 
union organisation that facilitates an active engagement in factory based production politics 
and in community and state power issues. It engages in alliances in order to establish 
relationships with political organisations on a systematic basis" (Lambert & Webster quoted 
in Desai & Habib, 1995, 30). 
Unions played an integral role in the anti apartheid struggle but their role and interaction with 
the final years of the apartheid regime had ramifications that ultimately lead to the formation 
of NED LAC. "The strength ofCOSATU prior to and during South Africa's political 
transition in the eady nineties created a unique opportunity to lever the National Party 
Government and business to develop and implement consensus-based policies" (Hirchson et 
aI, 2000: 101). That they were integral in laying the ground for the establishment of 
corporatism is best demonstrated by two incidences: the Labour Relations Amendment Act in 
1988 and the establishment of the National Economic Forum. NEDLAC was a result of a 
merger between the National Manpower Commission and the National Economic Forum. 
The 1988 Labour Relations Amendment Act sought to remove various Trade Union rights 
and was the focus of campaigns and mobilisation against the changes from COSA TU and 
NACTU. Two years of campaigning resulted in the establishment of an accord between 
COSATU, NACTU, the South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs 
(SACCOLA), the National Manpower Commission and the Department of Manpower. 
Knowm as the Laboria Minute, the agreement led to further negotiations on an improved 
LRA, passed in 1991. Further negotiations led to the promise by the state to pass legislation 
affording basic working conditions to new categories of employees hitherto not covered by 
legislation. 
The National Economic Forum was established after protests surrounding the introduction of 
VAT (Value Added Tax) in 1991. Union led strikes were twinned with a demand for a 
national macro economic forum whose membership would include business, the state, unions 
and political parties. "A year after the strike the state conceded a non-statutory NEF" which 
comprised various groups including the state, business and trade unions" (Habib, 1997, 65). 
Thus the preconditions for corporatism emerged prior to and during the transition period. In 
1993, Baskin wrote that "an institutionalised role for labour and capital in the formulation and 
regulation of economic policy is emerging." However, he went on to add "the union 
movement has little alternative but to engage with this trend and they are doing so through 
the NEF, NMC and similar bodies (Baskin, 1993: 1). In this period the role of trade unions 
again shifted and many commentators have noted the move from the politics of resistance to 
the politics of engagement in line with political trends elsewhere. Van Holdt further labelled 
the change as the emergence of "strategic unionism" or the "facilitating of the labour 
movement's participation in the determination of macro-economic policy" (Quoted in Desai 
& Habib, 1995: 30). At the time, Von Holdt was enthusiastic about the prospects for the 
Labour movement within the NEF and identified the NEF as a problem solving body and as a 
proactive body where key producer groups and the state could seek to "agree on macro-
economic policy and a new growth path for the South African economy" (Desai & Habib, 











believed would have serious consequences for the labour movement. There were many critics 
of the move towards corporatism but supporters tended to outweight or be more vocal during 
the transition period lO• If there was not unqualified outright support of a corporatist shift (see 
Baskin quote) within the trade union movement there was at the least an acknowledgement 
among the majority of trade union leaders that corporatism represented the "best worst" 
option for South Africa and the trade union movement. The reasons for this support are 
discussed below. 
Baskin identified four "compelling" union-specific arguments for corporatism. Stability and 
legitimacy during the transition period was a necessity South Africa needed "maximum 
possible social cohesion, despite the limits this places on necessary and far reaching change." 
As a fragile emerging democracy it needed "the support of institutional arrangements which 
can channel conflict, moderate it where appropriate and resolve competing claims on national 
resources." Secondly, corporatism was perceived as economically necessary, given the 
economic decline that South Africa was experiencing at the time!] . Baskin argued "No 
political party or economic class is strong enough alone to reverse these trends and effect 
economic restructuring. But both capital and organised labour are strong enough to block key 
changes '" unless the cake grows the outlook is bleak. And without agreed economic policies 
the cake will not grow." Thirdly corporatism was desirable in itself, in that it would "bring a 
meaningful say, for the first time, in the development of national policy ... unions can help 
guide the process (economic restructuring) and also cushion workers from some of the 
negative effects." Finally the alternatives on offer at the time were either unlikely or 
unbeneficial for the labour movement, from his viewpoint the alternative options were 
revolution, authoritarian government or the status quo (Baskin, 1993: 6-7). He later 
concluded that "in the process of transition and development labour must either be a 
participant, an observer or a victim; and that clearly participation is the optimum route." 
(Baskin, 1993 (II), 67). Baskin went further and suggested that a corporatist arrangement in 
South Africa could be expected to deliver the following benefits, and indeed if a corporatist 
institution that was to be set up in South Africa could be judged on its ability to meet the 
following criteria: 
• "stabilise the democratic transition 
• aid the achievement of reasonable economic growth 
• make gains for workers directly (by, for example, increasing wages) or indirectly (through 
the social wage); 
• soften short term hardships associated with economic restructuring 
• go beyond temporary arrangements and institutionalise a role for labour in economic 
policy formulation 
• result in increased union strength and representatives 
• Enhance worker participationlcontrol at the workplace and improve the quality of 
working life" (Baskin, 1993: 8). 
COSA TU also supported the move towards corporatism and further encouraged its extension 
for distinctly political reasons. Habib argues that "the conversion of COSA TU leaders to 
corporatism was facilitated by their participation in the tripartite alliance under the hegemony 
10 These arguments are examined in closer detail in chapters three and four. 
11 "Gross Domestic Product has shown negative growth during the 1990' s - the economy contracted by over 2% 











of the ANC. This conditioned their strategic choices and tied them into support for the new 
consensual capitalist order negotiated primarily between the ANC and NP." In ideological 
terms, the collapse of communism and the likelihood of a socialist revolution practically 
obsolete left the trade union ideological stance in retreat. For trade unions "the only available 
ideological home was that of social democracy (which) accepted the reality of capitalism, but 
it also intended to negotiate a better future for the working class" (Habib, 1997: 71). As a 
NUMSA official is quoted as saying: " it is important. .. not to resort to Marxist rhetoric and 
dogmatism but to provide answers to questions facing the working class today. What do we 
tell the 9000 workers in the tire manufacturing industry when tariffs are removed and their 
jobs are at stake? Do we tell them to wait for a socialist revolution?" Bird and Schreiner 
(NUMSA officials) in 1992 sought to encourage the move to "socialist democracy" in the 
transition era. They argued for "an ongoing process of empowering institutions and 
organisations, outside of the state, to participate in the decision making process and thereby to 
exercise meaningful control over that state between elections .... Our conception is of a lean 
interventionist state which regulates the market through a range of instruments, including 
nationalisation, but does not do so on its own. It seeks to gain consent for policies from civil 
society through appropriate negotiating institutions" (Bird & Schreiner, 1992: 23). 
Corporatism was seen as one mechanism of ensuring the existence of negotiating institutions. 
Adler and Webster argue that the move to corporatism was a continuation of the radical 
reform strategy of the labour movement that had been apparent since the 1970's. 
"Disciplined and sophisticated social movements may, through a strategy of radical reform be 
able to inject more progressive content into the democratisation process and wrest important 
concessions from reformers and moderates alike" (Quoted in Habib, 1995: 36). The 
developments starting from FOSATU's registration in the 1970's through to the establishment 
of political allegiance in 1985 and to the establishment of the NEF are evidence of such a 
strategy. Hence corporatism is the natural progression of such a strategy. Roger Southall 
reiterates this point, and in returning to coporatist theory he attempts to explain what the trade 
union movement may have considered to be the benefits of the adoption of corporatism in a 
capitalist state: 
"the strength of the corporatist perspective is that it tries to grapple with the realities of the 
post socialist world ... global experience shows that a working class that is industrially and 
politically organised can counter the polarising effects of capitalism and provide for a 
relatively just society. The Scandinavian social democracies of Europe and Germany where 
unions work in code termination with capital are all capitalist states yet their capitalist 
systems are more equal and socially just than the capitalism of the United States. They are 
far from perfect societies, yet the power of organised labour has forced capital to reach a 
working compromise" (Southall, 2001: 36). 
However, in reality, COSATU also had to deal with a very real political marginalisation. 
Despite its perceived power, its application to attend CODESA (The Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa) in 1991 was rejected and from this point onwards many perceived 
COSA TU as the much weaker partner in the tripartite alliance. The adoption of a negotiating, 
compromising stance was according to Habib merely illusionary and "belied a vigorous 
contestation as both capital and labour sought to position themselves in the post-election 
period. It is in this context that corporatist solutions were posited a reasonable outcome." 
(Habib, 1995: 32). In reaction to the reduction ofits autonomy and authority in political 
terms, COSA TU sought to "extend the transition's process to include economic restructuring" 











decisions, something it had lost in the political negotiations which took place between 
political parties" (Adler and Webster, 1998: 21). Indeed, Adler and Webster argue that 
NEDLAC is a direct result ofCOSATU influence. "Its structures and powers were largely 
designed by COSATU intellectuals (as opposed to those within the ANC) who had previously 
conceptualised the NEF and had for many years been attempting to transform the NEC" 
(Adler and Webster, 1998,22). 
Business- apartheid, transition and beyond 
The role of business in the Apartheid State and the relationship between the two were 
complex issues. However brief this examination of the two may be, they are necessary in 
order to understand why business supported the establishment of NED LAC, particularly in 
the light of the percieved economic power held by South African Businesses. Innes argued in 
1990 that "one thing is for sure: the maxim that the business of business is business is not 
applicable within a phase of fundamental political and social transformation." He suggested 
that communication and engagement were key factors, more important even than the content 
of discussions. The transition period would be a "phase of testing who really has power in the 
country and what the extent of that power is. Within this context business will have to ask 
itself the key question: what power does business have, especially in relation to other 
organised groups." (unknown source) 
Labelling business as one distinct group in South Africa is misleading. An important 
protrusion from the apartheid era was and remains the plethora of business organisations and 
the fractured nature of the relationships between groups. "Given that the Apartheid State 
discriminated against black workers and entrepreneurs, whilst actively favouring Afrikaner 
capital over English Capital, another legacy of the past is the language and racial fault line 
which persists in the national multi-sectoral trade associations" (Natrass, 1998: 22). Four 
multisectoral employer organisations exist, with three being represented by BSA along with 
16 other sectoral organisations at NEDLAC12, and the fourth association, NAFCOC stands 
alone and represents itself at NEDLAC13 • It is estimated that 30% of the total number of 
active businesses are represented at NED LAC through these organisations, but that the 
element offormal employment and GDP represented is a significantly higher percentage. 
(Bernstein, 1999: 45). 
Despite the divisions ingrained by the apartheid state, there is no doubt that many businesses 
benefited from the policies of the Apartheid State and businesses contributed in tum towards 
the apartheid state's continuing economic viability and ability to derive support from the 
minority white population. "The apartheid economy ensured that small groups of white 
capitalists became enormously wealthy, secured the privileges and incomes of the white 
middle and working classes, crushed nascent black business and impoverished the black 
majority (Macun & Karl Von Holdt, 1998: 70). But a historical overview reveals an 
ambiguous relationship between the state and business that eventually reached a decisive 
turning point. By the 1980's there was a broad realisation within the capitalist business sector 
that the apartheid regime was at best unsustainable from an economic point of view and at 
worst an immoral institution. In short, as the economic and political crisis became more 
apparent, so to did the need for business to increase pressure for change. Obviously, due to 
the fractured nature discussed above, collective action was difficult, but in addition, as 
12 The three are FABCOS, the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services, SACOB, the South 
African Chamber of Business and the AHI, the Afrikaner Handelsinstituut. 











Natrass points out, "opposing the Apartheid State had ramifications that extended way beyond 
the business environment. It challenged beliefs, relationships and social attitudes as well" 
(Natrass 1998). Nonetheless, as the economic crisis deepened, accompanied by a growing 
agitant black middle class and an increasingly articulate labour movement, business began to 
openly press for change. 
Business, despite the benefits it gained from the National Party Government, did not have a 
happy relationship with it. Frankel termed the relationship as an "unhappy bed-fellowship" 
and criticised the Government which he said was "largely incapable of comprehending the 
economic consequences of its single minded pursuit of political ideology" (Frankel, 1990: 
393). 
Business found itself "situated between an authoritarian state indisposed to receive advice 
from a pressure group outside the ruling party, and mass society sceptical of its sincerity" 
(Frankel, 1990: 409). Recognising that its primary role was ultimately in the generation of 
profit, many from the business sector nevertheless sought to question what sort of role 
business could or should play in a post apartheid order. Chris Ball of First National Bank 
wrote that business was the "engine room of the economy and by virtue of this has not only 
the right but indeed the duty to the community at large to make a positive contribution to 
socio-political development in South Africa" (Ball quoted in Frankel, 1990: 396). Frankel 
concluded: "A workable post apartheid system will be unavoidably different from the present 
order. Business should therefore seriously re-evaluate its commitment to unrestrained free 
enterprise principles in favour of various alternative formulae for economic development 
which advocate both growth and distributional goals." He added "the private sector has a 
function to assert its political rights as the primary element in the community responsible in 
the production of wealth and the making of public policy." (Frankel, 1990,401). 
In 1985 business representatives began talks with the ANC in exile, and dialogue with the 
future government was matched with dialogue with organised labour, the result of which is 
examined in the review of trade unions in this chapter. Bernstein argues that "these 
achievements were coupled with the concern of both organised labour and organised business 
that their interests and those of their constituencies could be marginalised in the post-election 
period" (Bernstein, 1999: 40). Hence the support for corporatism, or at least a form of 
corporatism, from the business constituencies. Following the publication ofthe RDP, Bobby 
Godsell, Executive Director of Anglo American wrote "Significant progress in the economy 
and in society will only occur if we as a nation design good policies, and implement these 
effectively. This will indeed require a partnership between government and civil society ... 
this partnership will have to commence with policy design and extend to its effective 
implementation." (Godsell, 1994: 46). 
In Business and Democracy: Cohabitation or Contradiction, Anne Bernstein argues at length 
that business has a vital role to play in both instituting and consolidating democracy and that 
business in South Africa played a vital role in the 1994 elections. Furthermore she asserts 
that it is vital for business to play an active role in consolidating democracies which present 
an "an extremely fluid environment" in order to establish and maintain the best environment 
for businesses to flourish in and deliver economic growth. Stability, economic viability and 
growth were crucial and critical issues in South Africa during the transition and were 












The review above examines the position of three distinct groups that currently participate in 
South Africa's corporatist project and looks at the conditions behind their support for 
corporatism. The review of each of the constituencies positions above seems to suggest, and 
corporatism theory would support, the theory that each group considered corporatism the least 
worst option - a necessary path to take given various trajectories both before and during the 
transition period. 
Needless to say, dissenting voices in all groups were present, and many argued that quite 
simply, the conditions for corporatism as reviewed in Chapter One, aside from the support it 
received from all three constituencies, were simply not present to make corporatism either a 
viable option or a successful one. These arguments draw on theoretical evidence as examined 
in Chapter One, and factorial evidence as regards South Africa's position pre, mid and post 
transition. Several commentators, such as Baskin at the time argued against corporatism. 
Baskin reviewed several factors, which he saw as necessary for the successful functioning of 
Corporatism. Although his review was in reference to Trade Union involvement, it 
nonetheless is indicative of the position of the corporatist project as regards all constituencies. 
His analysis emphasised the structure of industrial relations which affected the relationship 
between the capital and labour, and attempted to show ''that the existing framework is 
frequently at cross purposes to the corporatist goals the parties are pursuing" (Baskin, 1993: 
9). 
Economic prospects are unlikely to assist corporatism in its aims of delivery. "Economic 
decline is the corporatist trend's raison d'etre, but it is also a strong obstacle" (Baskin, 1993: 
9). Previous experiences show that corporatism is at its least successful when introduced to 
tackle economic problems, and most successful when pre existing corporatist arrangements 
are faced with emerging economic problems. In addition, "previous examples of success 
occurred in politically stable nations with economies that were significantly less under 
international duress and influence than the South African economy in 1999. The current 
economic conditions signal less regulation, yet corporatism exists to introduce successful 
regulation". Finally, Baskin argued, "basing policy formulation too heavily on consensus 
may be extremely time consuming and result in lowest common denominator polices and 
sluggish economic performance" (1993: 10). 
In reference to the Trade Union movement in South Africa, Baskin questioned whether 
COSA TU etc were capable of meaningfully engaging in a corporatist institution. "When it 
comes to capacity, the union movement is no match for its intended corporatist partners" 
(1993: 11). Further he questioned the actual representation within the Trade Union 
Movement, which accounted for a minority of the economically active population which was 
an even smaller percentage of the population given high unemployment levels. High 
Unemployment levels were a critical factor in the inapplicability of any corporatist 
arrangement in South Africa. In addition, the density of representation between sectors was 
uneven, with certain industries being vastly more active on the union front, and therefore 
unequally represented. 
Equally, however, he argued that "employer organisations are often unrepresentative and 
unable to present a common front" and due to the Apartheid inheritance as discussed above, 











for large companies to ignore employer and trade associations favouring unilateral 
engagement with Government or Trade Unions. 
Finally, Baskin argued that it was not a culture of unity that was characteristic in South 
Africa, rather an inheritance of adversarial, conflictual relationships which ran both deep and 
counter to any corporatist attempt. It is further questionable whether corporatism as was 
examined in Chapter One can function when two of the constituencies have such a close 
formal relationship or alliance prior to the establishment of corporatist relationshipsI4. It is 
equably doubtful that corporatism is either necessary or possible without a rough balance of 
power between the key producer groups and the Government. Further, it is striking that both 
business and labour have joined NEDLAC without any formal agreement over basic 
economic aims and the mechanisms for achieving them. "COSA TU is still formally 
committed to socialism and "the transfer of power to workers": business is committed to 
greater liberalisation and the expansion of market principles" (Bernstein, 1999: 54). 
But despite such conditions militating against the application of corporatism in South Africa, 
there were those that argued that that lack, or the uniqueness of South Africa's conditions 
made corporatism viable or at least "worth a try: "A growing economy, rising employment 
levels and improvement in both productivity and material well being are, at the very least, 
important contributions to the success of any corporatist project. "None of which are 
present in South Africa. But, "given that the alternatives to concertation may be worse for a 
country which has emerged from decades of conflict, and that there may be a commitment in 
the interests of development to a codetermined labour relations outcome, the economic 
circumstances may be less of a make or break matter than theory and experience of other 
countries might suggest." (Baskin, 1998: 10). 
Hence, Douwes Dekker suggests that South African corporatism is unique in its formation 
which reflects the very unique economic and political factors South Africa is trying to address 
and does not refer to NEDLAC as a form of corporatism I5 ; " South Africa ensured its form its 
form oftripartism and social dialogue could incorporate experience from other countries by 
designing structures and processes to meet local requirements and challenges ... not 
conceived of during the post World War II Western Europe experiment .... Thus NEDLAC 
emerged a critical institution from the 1990-1994 phase and has since 1995 facilitated 
legitimacy of new systems of governance to ease the transformation phase into the 
institutionalisation phase" (Douwes Dekker, 1998:8). 
In order to assess South Africa's supposed unique form of corporatism, and to further examine 
whether or not NELDAC is a form of corporatism at all, it is necessary to ask what NEDLAC 
has achieved, whether or not those achievements were intended, and conversely what it has 
not achieved. It is these issued that Chapter 3 seeks to address. 
14 The exception to the rule is Great Britain, where the Labour Party had formal links with Trade Unions until 
1994. The 
link provided trade unions with significant power: "this trade union power that has bought successive 
Governments to a standstill in recent years" (Finer, quoted in Marsh, 1992,46). Indeed the linkage and the 
subsequent power derived form unions were a major factor in Thatcher's backlash against the unions post 1979. 













If, as Chapter two suggests, corporatism was considered as necessary or the best worst option 
then one would expect NEDLAC to be a successful venture - because all parties appeared 
committed to it, they would therefore work towards its successful functioning and the 
fulfilment of its mandate. This chapter seeks to examine whether NEDLAC has been able to 
successfully broker corporatist style agreements as its founding Act suggests it must. The Act 
tlrequires that business, labour and Government seek consensus on matters that directly affect 
them before a law or any regulations are passed" (Bernstein, 1999: 40). In reviewing the 
activity of NED LAC in the immediate years following its formation, I examine firstly three 
examples of polices or Acts which NEDLAC has dealt with. I then tum to examine the 
position of each of the constituencies, where I look at the gains, successes, losses and failures 
that each perceive to have arisen from participation in NEDLAC. 
What has NEDLAC achieved? 
According to NEDLAC, between its formation in 1995 and 1998, 35 agreements were 
reached successfully. However this figure does not reveal whether these agreements were 
actually amendments to existing agreements or legislation, how important such agreements 
made were, and what cost or trade offs (if any) were involved in the culmination of the 
agreement. It tells us very little about the position or opinion of each of the parties to the 
agreement, or the opinion of those who were not party to agreements. In addition, it is 
impossible to gauge whether such issues would have been agreed upon without an institution 
such as NED LAC. Finally, there are no figures available for the number of issues that failed 
to reach agreement at NED LAC. Such factors are crucially important when considering 
whether or not NED LAC as an institution is functioning as intended, and delivering to the 
electorate or citizenry at large. 
Achievements have nonetheless been made and are broadly of two kinds - those that resulted 
in tangible agreements which are quantifiable, and those achievements that have built up trust 
and opened dialogue in areas previously considered not negotiable. The latter, however, are 
invisible and not tangible, making efforts to quantify them impossible. Below I review one 
tangible instance of success, the Labour Relations Act, which many perceived as the first and 
crucial test of NED LAC and one which to many observers proved that consensus through 
NEDLAC was possible. 
Labour Relations Act 
In February 1995 a new Labour Relations Bill was tabled for discussion in the Labour Market 
Chamber. The aim of the new Bill was to introduce" a Rolls-Royce system of labour 
relations" (Finer quoted in Bernstein, 1999: 44), and according to Habib the Bill, now law, 
"transforms the model of labour relations in South Africa (Habib, 1997: 68) and amongst 
other issues, it introduced: 
• An extensive right to strike, and enshrined the right of employers to lockout strikers 
• Voluntary centralised bargaining 
• A mechanism for the establishment of intermediate institution in case of the inability to 











• The establishment of workplace forums in all firms with 100 or more employees. 
Negotiations between the three parties in the Labour Market Chamber began in May with 
each party presenting responses and, after ten weeks and over 49 hours of formal meetings, 
agreement was reached in July. Habib observes that as part of the process NEDLAC 
"established a negotiating committee to reach consensus on the draft bill. After a number of 
negotiating sessions, two special NED LAC tripartite workshops involving senior 
representatives from each constituency, and the assistance of a Committee ofPrincipals16 and 
a technical committee, a number of agreements were concluded" (Habib, 1997: 66). 
Nonetheless, despite the widely heralded and lauded achievement of consensus, Labour and 
Business reached deadlock on several occasions, with Unions resorting to a campaign of mass 
action to ensure its demands were addressed. Despite the disagreement that at times marred 
the procedure, Webster argues that "the process through which this consensus was reached is 
remarkable in itself. Labour was able to exercise both mass action and negotiation in 
institutions to reach tripartite arrangements that drew the major stake holders together into a 
compromise agreement in which all parties had an interest ... (the process is) time consuming 
and elusive and arrives at agreements not completely satisfYing to all participants, (but) they 
can improve the quality of decisions, build political bases of support for the proposed reforms, 
and help consolidate democratic institutions" (Webster, 1998: 23). 
The Basic Working Conditions Act 
Whilst the Labour Relations negotiations heralded success, such optimism was short-lived. 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Bill, laid in February 1996, failed to reach agreement 
despite discussion at NEDLAC for 6 months on a green paper on employment standards. A 
particular area of discontent and disagreement for all three constituencies were the labour 
movement's demands for a 40-hour working week and six months statutory maternity leave. 
Business was concerned with the cost of the measures and argued that such policies would 
have a deleterious effect onjob creation and labour flexibility. By October 1996, after 
deadlock had been reached, The Department of Labour effectively bypassed the negotiating 
procedure and published the draft bill, inviting comment from the public and encouraged 
further negotiation at NEDLAC. In response COSA TU launched a programme of mass action 
in response to the Bill. Despite an attempt in May 1997 at further negotiations which ended 
within a month, ongoing protests by the labour movement and their supporters both in and out 
of Parliament, the Bill became Act in November 1997. (Bernstein, 1999: 44). None of 
Labour's demands had been heeded to. 
GEAR 
If the Labour Relations Act and The Basic Conditions of Employment Act are examples of 
whether or not NEDLAC has been able to function as a successful negotiating forum, GEAR 
has questioned the fundamental desire of the Government to allow NEDLAC to play an 
engaged and participatory role in economic policy at all. 
GEAR (Growth, Employment & Redistribution), published in June 1996, represented a new 
economic policy orientation and outlined the Government's macro-economic strategy. Its 
publication was in the wake ofthe failure of the RDP to reach many of targets and falling 
16 According to Webster & Gostner, the Committee of Principals evolved from late night "conversation groups" 











support of the RDP both within and outside the Government. In March 1996, the 
OfficefMinistry set up to implement various programmes as mandated by the RDP was 
dismantled. Jesmond Blumenfeld maintains that "more generally, the RDP, intended perhaps 
as a device for reconciling the demands of those who recognised the urgent need for polices 
that would promote rapid economic growth and those who perceived an equally urgent 
political need for more redistributive polices, proved able to satisfy neither set of 
protagonists" (Blumenfeld: 2000: 41). 
GEAR was published without consultation of either the public or the involvement of 
NEDLAC. Indeed on publication, Minister Trevor Manuel described GEAR as "non-
negotiable." This move was particularly significant given the emphasis of GEAR firmly 
neo-liberal - which went against traditional ANC party policy and certainly against the 
policies or ideologies of the ANC's tripartite partners, the SACP and COSATU. In addition, 
a major influence of GEAR appears to have been the publication "Growth For All" by the 
South Africa Foundation, an organisation that comprises the Chief Executives of the top 50 
businesses in South Africa, separate from BSA and not represented at NED LAC. Blumenfeld 
adds that the "adoption of GEAR was of fundamental importance, both politically and 
economically, in that it signalled not only the Government's acceptance of market-imposed 
criteria for the evaluation of its conduct of macro-economic policy, but also its eschewal of 
continuing calls from its radical constituencies for more "populist" measures" (Blumenfeld, 
2000: 43). GEAR also signalled the Government's willingness to bypass NEDLAC when 
necessary in order to implement certain economic or labour policies. 
As a result ofNEDLAC's inability at times to reach agreement on several key issues as 
examined briefly above and as a result of a general assessment of NED LACs functions, each 
ofthe three constituencies have evaluated the rationale behind NEDLAC's existence. They 
have also had to evaluate what they have gained and stand to gain from participation within it. 
It is to these issues that I now tum. 
Government 
Government's involvement in NEDLAC is examinable on 2 fronts. Firstly, its involvement 
with NEDLAC as one of the constituencies and secondly as the creator and ultimately 
sustainor of the institution. Thus any criticism on the working of NED LAC can also be 
perceived as being directed at the Government itself. 
The flexibility that is built into NED LAC means that no two items are treated in the same 
manner. "Each is handled differently depending upon constraints of time, their importance to 
different social partners, as well as their linkage to other items" (Bernstein, 1999: 41). Such 
flexibility is a double-edged sword: it has enabled a more fluid and adaptable negotiating 
environment, but equally it has given each party the ability to delay the culmination of 
negotiations. Such flexibility may also result in the culmination of negotiations without 
adequate consultation. It is because of these drawbacks that some have called for system that 
is defined through rules: "perhaps it is time to define ... some binding deadlines. In this way, 
parties would be given every opportunity to negotiate without being able to hold up the 
process unduly" (Bethlehem, quoted in Bernstein, 1999: 43). Despite its supposed fluidity, 
NEDLAC's formal structure has led to the development of structures for informal negotiating 
outwith NEDLAC, for example. the Committee of Principals that was formed during the LRA 
negotiations. Such structures rely on the interaction of individuals and is reliant on the 











has been built up between labour and business is "subject to the vagaries of leadership" 
(Bernstein: 1999, 7). These moves can be seen as an attempt to "achieve the spirit of 
NED LAC rather than the letter" (Gostner & Joffe, 2000: 80) and perhaps can be seen as an 
implicit acknowledgement that tangible agreements through the formal procedures may not be 
possible. Gostner & Joffe warn that" While the extra-constitutional structures represent an 
innovative response to the challenges of multi-partite policy formulation, they also hold the 
potential for undermining the structure of NED LAC ... as the constitutional structures 
become no more than rubber-stamps for less-than transparent negotiations" (Gostner & Joffe, 
2000,81). 
Equally problematic is the defmition of which issues are examined at NEDLAC. As the 
example of GEAR shows, Government has shown a level of ambiguity on this issue at by 
bypassing NEDLAC on the crucial issue of macroeconomic strategy. It is Government who 
decides which issues are examined and more importantly, what issues are not examined. But 
even within Government there is disagreement about "what constitutes important legislation 
and about whether such legislation will have an impact on the economy." (Bernstein, 1999: 
47). 
In terms of representation, some have criticised the dominance of national level Government 
at the expense and absence of representation from regional and municipal tiers of 
Government, despite the fact that the result of policy negotiations may have consequences for 
them. 
Like unions and business, Government, according to Les Kettledas, Deputy Director General 
of the Department of Labour, also suffers from capacity problems, broadly stemming from the 
sheer amount of work and number of meeting generated by NEDLAC. Lack of capacity, 
particularly in relations to the provision of adequately informed personnel or representatives 
has led some to comment that NEDLAC "structures are dysfunctional, no one can say that 
there is even a semblance of functionality." (Confidential interviewee, quoted in Gostner & 
Joffe, 2000, 92). 
Labour 
For Labour, involvement in NED LAC has been problematic for several reasons. 
Representation is seen by many as being dominated by COSATU, leaving little space for 
representation by other union federations. This is exacerbated by the perception that 
COSATU, due to its alliance with the ANC enjoys an immediately privileged position. In 
addition, many question the dominance of representation of formal labour, particularly when 
one considers that trade union representation covers 35% of formal employees in a country 
where as many as 30% of the workforce is unemployed or working in the informal sector. 
Employment generation is a critical economic issue, and the lack of representation ofthe 
informal sector or the unemployed is a serious flaw in NEDLAC's make up. Decisions 
necessarily reflect the interests of those privileged enough to be in employment, whis::h may 
be at the expense of the interests of those less fortunate. Some within COSA TU believe this 
is an unwarrented criticism and point to the historical precedence of representation beyond 
COSA TU's own formal narrow band of representation. Many considered COSATU the 
"formal" or "legal" focal point of the anti-apartheid struggle, but it is questionable whether 
COSA TU can continue to claim such support or representation in a post apartheid era. Indeed 
Von Holdt argued that corporatism itself would speed up the process of isolation for the trade 











organisation. "Corporatist Unionism tends to represent the narrow interest of its own 
members ... and loses its capacity to articulate a broader national interest" (Von Holdt, 1993: 
50). 
The perceived "negotiations behind closed doors" character of NED LAC has lead some to 
question the ability of union members or the "grassroots" to influence negotiations at the 
NEDLAC, and hence argue that corporatism is a factor behind the devaluation of democracy 
within the union movement. Negotiations, often technical in character combined with internal 
infrastructural problems within the union movement, have lead to weakened links between 
leaders and grassroots members, who have little say or input into negotiations and often know 
little about the results. 
In addition to questions regarding representational issues, some have questioned the ability, 
and ultimately the willingness of COSA TU to make compromises, necessary in an institution 
like NEDLAC, which are perceived as essential in the South African context vis-a.-vis 
economic growth and development. "Government expects union leaders to deliver restraint -
plus increased productivity - from their members. They are expected to playa dualistic role, 
first, that of sacrificing their narrow interests to the overall demands of national development; 
and second, the representation of the job interest of the rank and file members. The argument 
for the reversal of the primary role of unions to be developmental rather than representational 
is based on the belief that trade unions represent a small and privileged proportion of the 
labour force" (Webster: 1995: 29). 
Alternatively, from an ideological perspective, some have argued that NED LAC serves as a 
forum for the consolidation of an elite band of Labour and Union bureaucrats who use 
NEDLAC as a mechanism to perpetuate their power and positions. The effect on the union 
movement of corporatism is disastrous: Corporatism is perceived as a mechanism which leads 
ultimately to the "demobilisation ofthe mass base of the unions, and an alienation of the 
members from the leadership ... (and) co-opts labour into accepting the economic 
perspectives of capitalism ... (it) stabilises capitalist society and ensures that the labour 
movement cannot struggle for socialism. The labour movement is tied into corporatism and 
loses its capacity for independent action." (Von Holdt, 1993: 48). 
From the Trade Union movement's own perspective, developments within NEDLAC are 
increasingly viewed in a negative light and this has been further impacted upon by 
disillusionment with the ANC alliance on the issues surrounding GEAR and privatisation 
which are examined below. The trade union movement has at several junctures resorted to 
the use of mass action, notably during the negotiations surrounding the LRA and the Basic 
Condition of Employment. For some this has signalled the movements lack of commitment 
to NEDLAC, but for the union movement it reflects it frustration with the programme of 
refonn that South Africa is following. Unionists argue that the need to use mass action is 
important to protect against the domination of capital, while some go as far as suggesting a 
return to a more militant, defensive style of unionism. In reference to this protectionist 
attitude, a NUMSA official asserted that "when we negotiate, we never exclude the possibility 
of taking up a campaign. How seriously labour is taken at NEDLAC is always in relation to 
the threat other parties perceive outside the institution. There have been lots of areas where 
labour has not felt very happy about what's happened. At the end of the day, we're only 
going to be taken seriously if other players can see what we have behind us. Unless we can 
maintain the capacity to challenge, we're going to be totally ineffective" (Ehrenreich quoted 











During the LRA negotiations, Von Holdt reports that mass action was driven by the 
perception of gap between the grassroots and the ANC leadership & "impatience and 
scepticism about the intentions of the ANC led government" (Von Holdt, 1995: 32). The 
action undertaken did however result in some concessions being won by the labour caucus. 
He suggests however that the LRA experience reflected the "deeply differing views on the 
place of trade unions in our future" (Von Holdt, 1995: 34) and this in itself put in place an 
insurmountable barrier between trade unions, the Government and Business. 
Negotiations surrounding the Basic Conditions of Employment were a turning point for 
COSATU and the union movement. Inability to articulate its demands within NEDLAC or 
win concessions led to increasing concern regarding the marginalisation of the movement. 
Commentators noted that "recent experience in NEDLAC casts doubt on the commitment of 
the social partners to win-win compromises ... the federation hinted at ditching NED LAC and 
pursuing other avenues. It is becoming equally obvious that both capital and the state sees 
NEDLAC as an unnecessary burden" (Collins & Ray, 1997: 15). The labour movement 
ultimately resorted to mass action, with little effect, and its attempts to lobby the COSATU-
ANC caucus in parliament were equally ineffectual. 
Unionists themselves doubt the ability of the movement to play an active role in NEDLAC 
due to infrastructural and resource problems. Deanne Collins points out that "Business is 
better resourced than the unions, whilst most labour unions also have unions to run. 
Absenteeism from key meetings is common, and representatives are inadequately prepared for 
debate. Thus labour reacts to government and business proposals, putting forward only a few 
positions and not presenting a programmatic vision." One reason for this is due to flaws in 
the makeup of NED LAC (which I examine below) but there is also a capacity and skills crisis 
in the labour movement itself which restricts it from playing a more meaningful, active role in 
NEDLAC. Staff turnover since 1994 has been high, with many of the movement's most 
talented and educated leaders leaving to join business, politics or the civil service. 
Additionally many unionists have joined part-time politics, reducing the time that can be 
spent on union business. In 1995 the National Union of Miners had a total of 101 officials 
elected as local government politicians. Infrastructuraly the union movement has struggled to 
effectively use the negotiating spaces that it has been given within NEDLAC and there are 
many causes of this, from financial, personnel to ideological challenges. A "capacity crisis" 
has lead to numerous attempts at "capacity building" which aim to restructure unions in the 
face ofthe increased trend towards negotiation. 
The disillusionment within the Union Movement, interalia, of the ability of NED LAC to 
deliver advantages for the Labour movement and its perceived marginalisation revealed 
severe weaknesses within the movement and inspired the launch of September Commission 
by COSATU in 1997. The publication of the September Commission report by COSATU in 
1997 argued for a move towards social unionism which reflected COSATU's move away 
from its position as a major political force and echoes its current attempts to formulate a role 
or position which fosters co-operation with business. "COSATU'S central role as a player in 
the struggle to defeat the apartheid system is today matched by its inability to determine the 
agenda of economic and social transformation ... (social unionism) will enable COSA TU to 
proactively contest the transition ... the aim is to harness the organised power of COSA TU, its 
capacity to mobilise, ... to make important contributions to national, economic and social 
development" (Von Holdt, 1997: 12). Nonetheless the report favoured the continued 











The issue of GEAR and privatisation, briefly reviewed below has led to the perception 
amongst some trade unionists that neither corporatism, nor for that matter the alliance with 
the ANC have delivered tangible benefits to the trade union movement and thus the union 
movement should reject any further involvement with corporatism social partnerships or 
bargaining in favour of a return to militant agitation and mass protest. Trade Unionist Roger 
Ronnie argued that "social contracts and co-determination cannot change the nature of 
capitalism. COSA TU needs to change direction and develop militant strategies in support of 
workers' demands" (Ronnie, 1996: 2). Similarly, Glenn Adler points out that" those who 
thought the partnership had replaced adversarialism were dealt a blow by the struggle over the 
BCEA and the war of words over GEAR. Officials from the Department of Labour - the 
engine room of social partnership - have issued calls for the downgrading of NED LAC. 
Sections of Business would not be averse to abolishing it altogether" Alder, 1998: 74). 
However he warned the union movement that it faced a paradox: "a breakdown of social 
partnership is not in itself a bad thing: this is someone else's ideology which creates serious 
traps for labour. But if partnership is replaced by unilateralism, opportunities to advance 
working class interests will be lost" (Alder, 1998: 74). 
GEAR & privatisation - is the alliance breaking down? 
As discussed above, the ANC Government's publication of GEAR without the involvement 
of or consultation of NED LAC or any of its actors is perceived by many as an indication of 
the Government's ambivalence towards NEDLAC. For many it is also a sign of the ANC's 
ambivalence towards the COSATU-SACP Alliance haven chosen not to consult these 
partners either. 
Critics within COSATU have questioned several issues. Firstly, does this signal that the 
alliance at the very least should be re-established or reworked? Indeed some have questioned 
whether the alliance should be broken altogether. Secondly, what is the value of an institution 
like NEDLAC when Government is prepared to override it? Thirdly, what role does the 
Labour movement have in a state where the Government is incrementally adopting an 
distinctly neo-liberal position that is supportive of capital and business? In particular, what 
role does Labour have in NEDLAC, or any corporatist body, if business is the dominant 
partner? Sitas, quoted by Desai and Habib argues that corporate capital has successfully 
managed to "create its legitimacy and place it centre-stage in the transition process" hence the 
focus on "the economic growth debate, in every calculation and consideration its profitability 
and performance is a the centre of everyone's worries. Such a central role makes it unlikely 
that any "radical economic agenda would survive the ravages of negotiations within a 
corporatist institution" (Desai and Habib, 1995: 35). 
Nonetheless, many still argued for the preservation of the alliance despite the publication of 
GEAR. Sam Shilowa argued that from COSATU's point of view "government should subject 
it (GEAR) to scrutiny and criticism ... of course the ANC will argue for GEAR, that is fine, it 
is their document. But if we are able to show its disastrous consequences, the masses may 
back us to a point where certain sections may be reconsidered." This did not, however, occur, 
but equally, many of GEAR's goals have also not been reached. Parsons argues that 
disagreement over GEAR may preclude the possibility of reaching agreement on several other 
issues, but nonetheless, "it does not preclude NEDLAC from reaching consensus on a wide 











But if GEAR was to be the source of tension, the issue of privatisation has continued to be a 
source of fundamental disagreement between the ANC and COSA TU and has often had a 
negative impact on the functioning of NED LAC. The issue of privatisation has been, similar 
to GEAR, dealt with largely outside the confines of NED LAC, again questioning the 
ambivalence of both the Government and the Unions towards the institution. 
The ANC Government have embarked on a process of privatisation, aiming to effect the open 
sale of state assets, but also other processes that tum state functions over to the private sector 
and the market. It is one of the major tenants to economic policy as expressed initially in the 
RDP and further endorsed through GEAR. It was advocated that state institutional reform was 
needed in order for state assets to be used address the apartheid legacy and promote 
employment and service delivery to people who were disadvantaged. Government and 
documents published since have avoided the term privatisation, preferring terms such as 
"restructuring" or "public-private partnerships. 
Realising the potentially divisive nature of a privatisation programme, the Government sought 
to create a National Framework Agreement (NF A) on the restructuring of state assets and 
negotiated this framework with Labour outside the confines of NED LAC as a bilateral 
agreement, tabling it only information purposes at NEDLAC. Agreement was reached 
following intensive negotiations between Government and Labour in December in 1995 and 
January 1996, in February 1996. The NF A sought to "recognise the right of all role players to 
develop their own mandates, receive advice, and shape their views on the process of 
restructuring" (NF A, 1996) and set up a three tier structure for the consideration of the 
"restructuring" process which would allow labour to voice its opinion on the issues and 
process. In the words of the NFA, it sought to set up a system "to explain the Government's 
position, share and discuss strategic and policy documents that have a material impact on the 
restructuring discussion. Since its formation however, Unions have become increasingly 
dismayed at the failure of the Government to discuss the restructuring programme and the 
divergence of opinions between the two continue to grow as the state attempts to increase the 
pace of reform. In August 2000 the Ministry of Public Enterprises published a Policy 
Framework, "An Accelerated Agenda Towards the Restructuring of State Owned 
Enterprises." The document outlined the Government's wish to push forward "a more 
comprehensive framework than has existed to date, in order to ensure a consistent approach to 
restructuring across Government and to address perceived market uncertainties about 
Government's restructuring priorities." In the light of "virtually unanimous support for the 
argument that establishing competitive markets is the most important policy component of 
any restructuring initiative. The failure to establish such competitive conditions will, at best, 
lessen the full microeconomic improvements and, at worst, lead to serious economic abuses 
of monopoly power" (Government document, 2000). 
The move towards privatisation is not supported by COSA TU and since the publication ofthe 
paper it has encouraged members to engage in mass demonstrations, strikes and stay-aways. 
It has become increasingly vocal in its criticism of the Government, and there has been talk 
that the privatisation issue is best dealt with by COSA TU withdrawing from the Alliance. 
The most recent official position advocates that the alliance must stand: "Of course COSATU 
is disappointed that the ANC-led government has chosen to believe naively in the benefits of 
privatisation. We are disappointed, too, that the ANC has let government departments take 
policy positions that diverge from those of the Alliance. But that does not mean that the 
Alliance is under threat. The Alliance is like a marriage: we can have disagreements without 











develop a common programme on the transformation of the economy and the state, and to 
ensure that government policies reflect the strategies of the democratic movement. We hope 
that in the long run, this campaign will bring us closer to these aims" (Cosatu Website, 16 
August 2001) 
Business 
The participation of Business in NEDLAC has also been fraught with difficulty and has 
drawn criticism from those within the sector as equally as it has from those outside the sector. 
Representation appears to be the key issue of contention. Business on the whole has won 
some valuable concessions from NED LAC, the most visible and successful concessions 
arising from the Basic Standards of Employment Act. 
According to Natrass, "since the 1994 elections, the greatest challenge facing business has 
been to forge some kind of unity to participate meaningfully in South Africa's tripartite 
institutions - most notably NEDLAC. The fact that the ANC came to power on the basis of 
an alliance with the trade union movement made the need for concerted action on the part of 
business all the more pressing" (Natrass, 1998: 27). Business has been unable to broker any 
such unity. In terms of representation at NEDLAC, BSA and NAFCOC represent business. 
BSA was formed in June 1994 but by the time of NED LAC's launch, had lost NAFCOC, the 
major organisation representing black business that had withdrawn and now shares 
representation with BSA at NEDLAC. Hence business representation is still perceived, as 
examined in Chapter Two, as resting on racial divisions, and this is an obvious a matter of 
contention. 
Within BSA itselfthere appears to be little unity. BSA represents 19 organisations, and there 
have been calls from some of those organisations that small businesses are not adequately 
represented or consulted, with big business being represented disproportionately. This was 
exacerbated by the Labour Relations Act negotiations where two ofBSA's members were 
particularly against certain aspects that BSA was ready to concede and became frustrated at 
the lack of mandating or consultation procedures during the negotiations. "Chief negotiators 
reported back to BSA committees where possible, the time pressures placed on the 
negotiating process resulted in BSA effectively mandating the negotiators to do the best they 
could ... different individuals often presented their organisations in BSA meetings - very few 
had a complete picture of what was being negotiated. Those members with the resources to 
spare were able to attend more meetings and hence had a greater impact on the BSA 
negotiating position" (Natrass, 1998: 28). This position was and continues to be further 
exacerbated by the fact that all members, regardless of size, pay the same membership fees, 
further consolidating the position oflarger businesses. 
An additional representational problem is the recognition of the needs of different regions: 
many perceived BSA to be dominated by the mining and financial sectors. Hence the 
criticism that NED LAC is little more than "big business and big labour looking after 
Gauteng." (unknown source). 
Natrass concluded in 1998 "although the creation ofBSA represents and important step away 
from the fragmented and divided structure of organised business under apartheid, important 
fault lines still exist. Regional, sectoral, material and ideological cleavages remain to make 
new found business unity distinctly fragile" (1998: 28). Representational issues dominate, but 











Whilst big business may be perceived to dominate NEDLAC, developments outside 
NEDLAC may ultimately devalue the business role in NEDLAC altogether. Firstly, the 
influence that the SAF publication had on the eventual strategy as laid out in GEAR is 
striking. BSA or NAFCOC were not consulted at any time on the content of the document, 
nor was the document an issued for discussion by NEDLAC Similarly the establishment of 
the Brenthurst group signalled the ANC's ease with, and perhaps preference for, listening to 
or consulting business on a smaller scale. The Brenthurst Group was formed at the request of 
Nelson Mandela during constitutional negotiations to advise the new Government and give 
input on certain issues and consists of 15 Chief Executives of some of the largest companies 
in South Africa. As one executive commented: "organisations ... do good work, but 
organisations look for consensus, and when you look for consensus you tend to water down 
and moderate your view. I think that when you speak as an individual of substance to 
somebody else of substance, you can be more frank" (Quoted in Natrass, 1998: 27). The 
existence of such alternative modes of influence reduces the power and influence, and 
possibly the credibility of formal business groups and their representation attempts both 
within and outside NEDLAC. However, Ben Van Rensburg, Director of Economic Affairs at 
the South African Chamber of Business commented that "You cannot see NEDLAC as the 
only place of influence in society there must be various levels of influence. Its all of our 
duty to use those other areas as far as we possibly can" (Collins, 1996: 31). 
Conversely, the small, often informal sector of business, such as one-person shops, informal 
entrepreneurs are a group completely ignored by NEDLAC and business representation. 
Bernstein points out that it is these groups that "government and business are firmly 
committed (at least verbally) to promote and expand, are the least effectively represented in 
these kinds of forums, mainly because most of them are too busy trying to survive" 
(Bernstein, 1999: 51). 
Bernstein argues that corporatism is not the only way business can assure that its opinions are 
heard in South Africa. She concedes that NEDLAC's establishment, believed to be necessary 
for growth and restructuring, was the product of unique conditions but "what might have been 
the best, the inevitable or the only response by business ... might no longer have positive 
benefits for business or society." (Bernstein, 1999: 53). The dominance of the bargaining 
method has led to business neglecting alternative modes of influencing policy and politicians: 
"it is noteworthy that business funded organisations or NGOs promoting market values and 
approaches are significantly underrepresented in the plethora of new organisations lobbying 
parliament with, in many cases, considerable success." (Bernstein: 1999: 53). Corporatism 
was an arrangement that suited the power relationship as they emerged in 1994. Business's 
participation in COSA TO driven process added to the consolidation of trade union power at a 
time when all other factors were mitigating against the increase of trade union power, for 
example, international economic influences. Ultimately, Bernstein assesses the participation 
of NED LAC in a negative light: "the constraints of corporatism could inhibit certain business 
spokespersons from spelling out the implication of many actions take by labour and that will 
affect South Africa's global competitiveness and internal social stability in negative ways. In 
other words, one of the costs ... is sometimes to divert and defuse the business voice in public 
debate on critical policy issues" (Bernstein, 1999: 53). 
Nonetheless Raymond Parsons argues that "NEDLAC performs an important function in 
keeping the constituencies equally informed of significant developments, and provided a 











policymaking; and reduces the ideological and other divides which still characterise the 
country ... NEDLAC may well be regarded as an important investment in "social capital" that 
could, in time, result in the development of a high trust society that is synonymous with 
healthy, prosperous and competitive societies in other parts of the world" (Parsons quoted in 
Bernstein, 1999: 49). 
What is the future for NEDLAC? 
Initial successes reiterated the support of and suggested that the choice of corporatism and the 
formation of NED LAC had been correct were soon to be overridden by further developments 
and perhaps the most revealing and significant issue within this chapter has been that of 
GEAR. The publication of GEAR appears to have fundamentally questioned and challenged 
the support given to NEDLAC by all constituencies. The Government appears to consider 
NEDLAC as a non-statutory consultation body, whilst for the Union movement, it has lead to 
the questioning of its role in NEDLAC and for COSATU, its role in the tripartite alliance and 
the guarantor and deliverer of political support for the ANC. The business sector participants 
in NEDLAC found themselves excluded from the group (SAF) that appeared to be the major 
business influence on Government, when BSA was not consulted by SAF on the document 
which was to be the major influence on GEAR. Business also began to question whether 
NEDLAC is the most effective way to influence Government, not only does it appear that 
NEDLAC is increasingly ineffectual but business had also won major concessions from 
Government as government policy turns increasingly towards neo-liberal policies which 
business has always been broadly in favour of. 
As Baskin suggests, perhaps NEDLAC should have been viewed as a short-term arrangement: 
"in the heat of the struggle perspectives were inevitably short term. Business was concerned 
more with managing shopfloor and industrial relations turbulence than with finding longer 
term solutions, unions with their survival and with managing bread and butter and political 
goals simultaneously (Baskin, 1998: 3). As this review illustrates, constituencies appear to 
hold largely ambivalent if not negative views and responses to NEDLAC, which does not 
bode well for the long-term prospects of NED LAC or South Africa's corporatist project. 
Indeed, support for NEDLAC as a long-term institution is difficult to find. Again, this leads 
us to ask the question of whether NED LAC is an example of corporatism or if it was intended 
to function as a corporatist institution. If not, what sort of institution is it and what can it hope 













The preceding chapters suggest that corporatism was perceived as the necessary or least bad 
choice in line with the situation at the time in South Africa. Much criticism is focussed on that 
decision and the support it received from the relevant constituencies, and my review thus far 
has examined numerous counterfactual arguments based on theory and practice that explicitly 
suggest that corporatism was the incorrect path to follow. It is necessary to acknowledge that 
other options were available, and but it must equally be acknowledged that it is impossible to 
assess whether those other options would have been more successful or preferable to the 
experiences derived from corporatism through NEDLAC. As shown in Chapter 2, 
commentators such as Baskin believed the alternative positions for the Trade Union 
movement were the status of observer, victim or agitator. Whilst business, due to the 
economic power it held, was clearly never going to become a "victim" as such in the post-
apartheid order, it could have chosen to be an observer or agitator. An alternative situation to 
corporatism is a pluralist situation, where extensive participation in the political process 
occurs through competition between autonomous groups and competing viewpoints. 
Although each group is not always successful in succeeding in having its demands met, it is 
assured of equality of access to put their demands forward. Groups are independent of the 
state, and no group has representational monopoly. Schmitter describes pluralism as a system 
where "the constituent units are organised into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, 
competitive, non-hierarchical ordered and self-determined categories which are not specially 
licensed, recognised, subsidised, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or 
interest articulation by the state and which do note exercise a monopoly of representational 
activity within their respective categories" (Schmitter, quoted in Habib, 1998:59). 
Nonetheless, both chose to be participants in a corporatist project, despite counterfactual 
evidence militating against its success, affording them privileged access over and above other 
groups. The primary focus in this chapter is the return to the assertion that corporatism and 
NEDLAC was an instance or instrument of the transformation period in South Africa, and 
should have been seen as such rather than an ongoing corporatist project or a means to 
mediate key producer groups interests in the long term. 
What then is happening now? This Chapter reviews three issues. Firstly, I seek to address the 
issue of whether NEDLAC is an example of corporatism at all. If this is the case, i.e. if it is 
not corporatism, then what is it? Secondly if as chapter three suggests, NED LAC is not 
functioning as intended, how are key producer groups interests being mediated, if they are 
being mediated at all. Finally, I look at the issue ofthe future for NEDLAC, and look at the 
likelihood for NED LAC's continued existence and what might come to replace it. 
NEDLAC - a true example of Corporatism? 
It is arguable that NEDLAC is not an example of corporatism, rather it is an example of 
tiparitsm. Wyn Grant describes tripartism as "a weak form of liberal corporatism which the 
state, capital and labour engage in macro level discussions on economic policy which, 
however, only result in general guidelines for the conduct of policy ... with no firm 
responsibilities on the partners to implement any policies to which they have agreed" (Grant, 
1995: 9). Such a definition is comfortably applied to NEDLAC particularly in the light of 











unable to broker firm agreements between parties, with all parties using alternative means of 
influence when they see fit. 
In addition NED LAC itself displays characteristics which are obviously "uncorporatist" in 
character. Most striking of these is the existence ofthe fourth chamber. The fourth 
"development" chamber supposedly exists to consider and negotiate social policy. 
Membership of the Development chamber consists of several interest groups that represent 
different areas of civil society, for example, the South African National Civics Organisation 
and the Woman's National Coalition. In 1997, the Development Chamber addressed issues 
such as housing policy and the draft Water Services Bill. The fourth chamber's inclusion is 
regarded one of the "unique features aimed at meeting the particular needs of the South Africa 
situation" and "the decision to incorporate a fourth constituency in NEDLAC and the actual 
process of constituting this constituency were both novel developments in the history and 
experience of co-operative institutions such as NEDLAC" (NED LAC website: 
http://www.nedlac.org.zaf). Its effectiveness, however, is largely regarded as weak, and many 
civil society organisations prefer to or have resorted to lobbying in parliament and the 
executive. 
However even if NED LAC is not an example of corporatism but oftripartism, there remains 
elements of support form some sort of institution. As one commentator asserts: "The fourth 
chamber of NED LAC reflects the necessity facing developing countries to restructure 
tripartism. Tripartism was appropriate for developed countries particularly in their struggle 
after World War II reconstruction crisis and reflect the belief in full employment. Tripartism 
remains essential for developing countries to ensure success in measure social as well as 
economic terms but its legitimacy is enhanced through incorporation of other interest groups. 
Social progress and social dialogue based on tripartism ensures stability for economic 
growth" (Douwes Dekker, 1998: 69). I return to this issue later when I examine what 
possibilities lie ahead for NEDLAC. 
A recurring theme has been the issue of the balance of power between the state and key 
producer groups. In Austria, the Government sought to minimise the imbalance by allowing 
the chamber of commerce to be the only business representative, allowing a measure of 
political control if Business was seen to be exerting too much power. Nevertheless, theory 
suggests the need for at least a rough balance of power, and evidence thus far has shown that 
the lack of such a balance of power in South Africa may be one reason for NEDLAC's 
inability to function as hoped. Government has not thus far attempted to counteract a 
supposed imbalance, as the Austrian case suggests is necessary. It is widely perceived that 
business is the stronger partner and Its strength is derived from the globalisation and mobility 
of both business and capital. This when coupled with the need to secure economic growth, 
increased investment and employment opportunities affords Business in South Africa a very 
strong hand. Trade Union movements are only likely to be able to match such power when 
the economy is near to full employment; a position South Africa is unlikely to attain in the 
foreseeable future. Bernstein points out that "the opening ofthe economy provides business 
and government with an important new lever. For business its bargaining sanctions have 
never been as dramatic or visible as mass marches or strikes. What could it do before? 
Quietly invest less, merchandise more and work it out. There is a new dynamic now and that 
is South African capital can move to South Africa's neighbours or further afield. This 












A reaction to the power held by business is articulated in neopluralist theory which seeks to 
address and "acknowledge that the development of an advanced industrial state is not directly 
controlled by citizens ... power in society is fragmented between economic and political 
authority systems, but in such a way as to preserve a very substantial capability for reforming 
the undeniable social problems, economic strains and political dilemmas which must 
inevitably remain" (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987: 285). 
A good example of such theories is the work of Charles Lindblom that places business at the 
heart of control in a polyarchical17 state, or what he terms a "market orientated polyarchy". 
(Lindblom, 1977) The decisions regarding production and distribution of goods are decisions 
that each state must make, or at the very least, have a system of whereby such decisions are 
made. The importance of such decisions is huge, as is their influence. In the polyarchy, 
rather than make such decisions within the arena of public policy, the state has delegated such 
decisions to the market, and its role is little more than ratification or regulation of such 
decisions. Therefore, the business executive is in fact a public official functioning in the 
market place. 
Conversely, Lindblom argues that the Business executive is also a public official in 
Government and politics. Because of the importance of economic performance on electoral 
success, the Government cannot be indifferent to the performance of business. Economic 
performance in this sense remains an area of public policy in terms of its political effects 
Government will therefore allow business to playa privileged position in influencing policy 
which both effects economic performance and is effected by economic performance. In 
addition, Government is not in a position to command businesses it must induce businesses 
to act in the interests of economic growth and as Lindblom points out, this is an imperative for 
Government: "every government accepts a responsibility to do what is necessary to assure 
profits are high enough to maintain as a minimum employment and growth" (Lindblom, 
1979: 174). Because of the primacy of business's activity, other groups, such as organised 
labour, have little to offer to induce such a privileged position. Organised labour for example, 
has to work - their members depend on work and wages to survive, whereas business have 
much more leverage in deciding whether to engage in the market, in what form and when. 
However, Lindblom is careful to point out that disputes between business and government are 
not uncommon, in fact they are common and often intense. But this is because ofthe major 
leadership roles that both occupy within the state. Such disagreements are however 
"constrained by the understanding that together they institute the necessary leadership for the 
system destruction of each other is not an option." (Lindblom, 1974: 176) Disagreement 
will not centre on primary issues of principle, for example, the right to private property, but 
will focus on secondary issues such as levels of business taxes or research and development 
subsidies. 
17 The modem usage of the term polyarchy originates from the work of Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom who 
used the word as a way of distinguishing the modem functioning democracy from the ideal, generic and 
theoretical democracy. A polyarchy can be understood as "a distinctive kind of regime for governing the 
modem state. Its distinctiveness arises from the combination of two general features: its relatively high tolerance 
of oppositions and the relatively widespread opportunities for participating in influencing the conduct of the 











Up to this point, Lindblom is careful to separate the forms of influence that government 
officials are open to, that of business, and those from the traditional polyarchical sources, i.e. 
interest groups. However he further asserts that business, not content with their influential 
position vis-a-vis policies that directly effect them, will encroach and dominate the forum of 
traditional polyarchical politics as well. "Both the privileged controls in the hands of business 
and the additional controls businessmen exercise through their energetic participation in 
polyarchical politics are established, stable and fundamental parts of government in the 
system called market orientated polyarchy." (Lindblom, 1977: 193). Again, because of the 
privileged position that business occupies, the influence they exercise will be unparalleled, 
sometimes covert and always dominant. Business will win int1uence and access 
disproportionately in comparison to other groups for several reasons, largely related to 
organisational capacity, resources and established access to Government. In this case, 
Organised labour, for example, is again in a disadvantageous position, as any organisation 
reliant on a large numbers of members for its support and resources will be in comparison to 
business. Lindblom further suggests that Labour is disadvantaged in far more subtle ways, for 
example the relative support it enjoys as compared to business from the general population 
will tend to be lower simply because business is represented as more respectable and "because 
their members have a higher social status ... the values they hold - private property, authority, 
etc - are those of the majority". (Lindblom, 1977: 198). Business defends the status quo, 
whilst organised labour appears to challenge it. 
If business is disproportionately powerful, then NEDLAC is merely a showpiece or a tool for 
managing troublesome (but not powerful) actors, and some argue that this is the main 
rationale for the state's involvement in a corporatist body. For Governments, corporatism 
allows it to pick and choose whom to negotiate with - it creates its own insider groups, often 
at the expense of all those left outside, and as Chapter One showed, "Sham" corporatism can 
be used by Governments to great advantage. Germany's Chancellor Ludwig Erhard 
recognised the value of formal co-operation and attempted to introduce a new order in to West 
Germany in 1965, advertised to the public as "societal formation". The impetus was the need 
to neutralise the power of interest groups ability to interfere with public policy formulation 
whilst recognising their indispensability in terms of the monopoly of information and control 
over their members which would relate to the successful implementation of policy. The aim 
was make them integral components of the policy process but at the same time neutralise 
certain aspects of those organisations. 
Offe argues that in corporatism the "partial privatisation of political power takes place" with 
decisions being "depoliticized," as soon as we leave an arena where democratic decision 
making takes place. (Offe, 1981, page number unknown). As discussed in Chapter one, the 
implementation of corporatism must also be assessed as a reflection of the state's autonomy 
and ability to structure relationships with groups as it wishes. 
These arguments are resonant when we further consider South Africa's situation. As one 
commentator reiterates, NEDLAC and corporatism is best seen as "as a necessary public 
partnership at an important stage of South Africa's development. The rationale of the 
partnership was simple that co-operation between business, labour and government interests 
was necessary for sound and sustainable policy development and for stable democratic 
transition. (Unknown interviewee quoted in Bernstein, 1999: 41). NEDLAC was therefore 
an integral instrument of South Africa's transition. As the apartheid Government had sought 
to neutralise the growing power of the trade union movement in the 1980's by legalisation of 











option into a corporatist body. However the potential to disrupt has been reduced by the 
power of business and therefore NEDLAC is perhaps no longer seen as necessary in the eyes 
of the current Government. 
To return to Lindblom's arguments, the current situation sees Government in dispute with 
business over certain issues, such as taxes, but the broad agreement has been reached on a 
neo-liberal agenda, or, as Lindblom describes them "primary issues of principle." 
Government is no longer in a position to negotiate those principles with either business or 
labour. One can suggest that the power now rests with business and the state, rendering 
NEDLAC redundant. 
For trade unions then, the future looks bleak. Re-examining Baskin's criteria for successful 
corporatism, it is clear that very few of the criteria have been fulfilled: 
• "stabilise the democratic transition 
• aid the achievement of reasonable economic growth 
• make gains for workers directly (by, for example, increasing wages) or indirectly 
(through the social wage); 
• soften short term hardships associated with economic restructuring 
• go beyond temporary arrangements and institutionalise a role for labour in economic 
policy formulation 
• result in increased union strength and representatives 
• Enhance worker participation/control at the workplace and improve the quality of 
working life" (Baskin, 1993: 67) 
Not only must it decide what role it can or should play in NEDLAC, given both the 
Government and Businesses antipathy towards it but also must deal with the imbalance of 
power that rests with Business and a relationship with the ruling party that is increasingly 
fraught. It is clear that corporatism cannot work for Labour if such an imbalance at NEDLAC 
continues. Equally, corporatism will not function if labour continues to override NEDLAC as 
an institution with mass action external to NEDLAC, although it is arguable that this is the 
only power trade unions have. 
As Alder warned in Chapter Three, the union movement faces a difficult paradox: "a 
breakdown of social partnership is not in itself a bad thing: this is someone else's ideology, 
which creates serious traps for labour. But if partnership is replaced by unilateralism, 
opportunities to advance working class interests will be lost" (Alder, 1998: 74). In the case of 
COSATU, the power the trade union movement has will be determined by the pressure it can 
exert as an alliance partner on the ANC as opposed to the power it can derive from 
participation in NEDLAC or any corporatist body. We may see a return to a more militant 
form of Unionism, and recent strikes on the issue of privati sat ion could be a signal of the a 
forthcoming wave or union or labour unrest in an attempt to reassert its power or influence in 
the wake of the decline in institutional negotiating possibilities. 
Labour, like the non-key producer interest groups is also having to learn about other modes of 
communication with the Government. Lobbying of Parliament and the Executive is a 
growing phenomenon, and COSA TU has increased its activities in this area following the 
perceived failures ofthe Basic Condition of Employment process. IfNEDLAC persists in not 











Business also senses the need to reposition itself in the immediate post transition era. 
Corporatism is viewed as a result of a unique relationship that business had with labour 
during the 1980's and 1990's and a product of the transition period. Bernstein concludes, 
"the corporate arrangement of representation and participation in NEDLAC locks the country 
into a particular representation of power relationships as they applied in 1993/4. Instead of 
allowing for the inevitable change in power and circumstance that liberalising the economy 
and democratic politics would bring, business participated in a COSA TV driven process that 
entrenched union power at the very time that other forces (strengthening the state, 
international economic forces) had begun to start changing those patterns" (Bernstein, 1999: 
53). Those special circumstances and structures have changed radically (for example, the 
Government's commitment to neo liberal economic policies) and as such, corporatism is an 
outdated system. Referring back to issues discussed earlier, the power structure as it exists 
now renders NEDLAC as unnecessary in the eyes of business. She argues that NEDLAC has 
also shielded business and other groups from experimenting with other ways that groups can 
influence and participate in public policy such as lobbying. 
The role ofthe state must also be questioned - does it still need to mediate key interest group 
demands, as asserted in the introduction? Ifbusiness is as powerful as neopluralists would 
suggest, then the state is frequently being overridden by business or the state is negotiating 
solely with business at the expense of all other interest groups including Labour. It may, 
however, be more convenient for the state to push for the continuation of a body such as 
NEDLAC in order to formalise and co-opt Labour to minimalise agitation that could arise. 
Commentators in the early days of NED LAC were immediately sceptical of NED LAC's 
abilities. In 1996 Baskin commented that "Unless NELDAC can carve out a role for itself as 
an active facilitator of policy consensus frameworks or agreements, it runs the risk of 
becoming discredited and irrelevant as an institution" He ultimately argued that the key factor 
behind NEDLAC's success would be will of each of the participants to play the corporatist 
game, which appears to be in steady decline. "None ofthis can succeed without the 
commitment or organised business to a more patriotic outlook and a more corporatist society; 
nor without a new approach from labour, indeed a different type of union movement. In 
theory there is a way forward. In practice it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the manifest 
disjuncture between policy direction and reality remains. At least for now" "Baskin, 1996: 
14). As has been raised at several points throughout this study, there is a lack of fundamental 
agreement between labour on one side and business and Government on the other, on basic 
economic ideology. One of the key factors in the success of Austrian corporatism, according 
to Marin, was the "ideological undetermination" that was a feature of both groups an absent 
factor in South Africa 
Conclusion 
Whilst NEDLAC may have contributed towards a stable democratic transition (on~ofBaskin's 
criteria for judgement of the success of NED LAC) it is questionable whether that need still 
exists, and if not, can NEDLAC continue to contribute towards democratic consolidation? 
From many sides the future of NED LAC and Corporatism in South Africa is in the light of 
this analysis, extremely questionable. Chapter Two demonstrated the unique factors that lead 
to the institutionalisation of corporatism in South Africa, whilst Chapter 3 showed 
corporatisms' lack of success and the haemorrhaging of support and participation of all 
partners. It is highly dubious and questionable whether Corporatism itself and NEDLAC 











comments ofDouwes Dekker that there is still the need for some sort of relationship between 
the state and key producer interest groups, but as chapter three suggests, the issues discussed 
and agreements made will probably become less important - GEAR has set a trend that will 
continue. 
Corporatism was a valid and valuable institution in the transition dispensation, Adam and 
Moodly argued that economic factors and particularly economic interdependence are a 
moderating factor in the conflictual inheritance derived from the apartheid era. "Economic 
interdependence, which gives all contenders a vested interest in the maintenance of the 
industrial base of the country, and thus creates a common interest, shared by all. What is 
being contested in this industrial area is the distribution of power and privilege and not 
matters of absolute value as defined in ideological terms. These economic and political 
interests, unlike ideological and religious issues are open to compromise and thus 
bargainable" (Quoted in Esterhuye & du Toil, 1990: 67). Sisk correctly asserts that 
The key to democratic consolidation will rest with the management or regulation of conflict, 
as opposed its resolution, through the new institutions" (Sisk, 1994: 73) but NEDLAC as a 
corporatist institution cannot continue to act as an instrument of the transition, mediating the 
demands of key producer groups. Gallager contends that "fully fledged corporatism is a 
comprehensive and deep rooted decision making culture rather than just a collection of 
superficial institutions" (Gallagher et aI, 2001: 218). Streeck further argues that "It is 
conceivable that there are societies that, for whatever reasons, have not and cannot acquire the 
capacity to develop corporatist structures (Streeck, quoted in Grant, 1985: 11), and South 
Africa, in my opinion, fits into Streek's description. The future may be in a less formal 
tripartite arrangement, as suggested by Douwes Dekker in Chapter Two: " South Africa 
ensured its form its form of tripartism and social dialogue could incorporate experience from 
other countries by designing structures and processes to meet local requirements and 
challenges ... not conceived of during the post World War II Western Europe experiment ... 
Thus NEDLAC emerged a critical institution from the 1990-1994 phase and has since 1995 
facilitated legitimacy of new systems of governance to ease the transformation phase into the 
institutionalisation phase" (Douwes Dekker, 1998:8). 
NEDLAC has passed its "sell by" date, and the South African corporatist project has all but 
died. 
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